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The Oregon coast is facing the dual perils of climate change and the catastrophic 
Cascadia subduction zone earthquake and tsunami, yet many communities remain 
unprepared. Using qualitative interviews with residents of Coos Bay, Oregon, this study 
traces how communities facing these perils socially construct their visions of change by 
“remembering the future” and how this future memory influences unsettlement that, in 
turn, can trigger revision of strategies of action to deal with environmental risk. 
Participants understood these risks through three interrelated themes: analogy to familiar 
circumstances such as regular winter flooding, narratives of isolation and self-reliance 
based in collective history, and visions of symbolic preparedness. Each of these themes 
drew the conversation away from the material reality of environmental catastrophe, 
reducing relative unsettlement. Since the way that communities collectively understand 
environmental risk may influence preparatory action, these observations can help to 
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In recent years, sociologists have used a number of theories developed outside of 
the realm of environmental studies to improve our understanding of people’s 
idiosyncratic responses to environmental risk (e.g. Norgaard, 2011, Brulle et al., 
forthcoming). Environmental risk, and especially risk posed by climate change and other 
natural disasters, presents special challenges to individuals and communities due to the 
uncertainty inherent in how these risks will manifest over time. For example, while 
scientists are in substantial agreement that the effects of climate change will be felt on the 
Oregon coast, significant uncertainty exists as to the exact nature of these effects and 
when they will manifest. This includes wildly variant predictions of the expected 
frequency and magnitude of future coastal flood events, as well as about how such flood 
events might impact physical landforms and human communities (Baron et al., 2015, 
Cheng et al., 2015, Wong et al., 2014, Moser et al., 2014, Mote et al., 2014, Serafin & 
Ruggiero, 2014, National Research Council, 2012).  
On the Oregon coast there exists another form of risk posed by coastal change: 
that of the Cascadia subduction zone (CSZ) earthquake and tsunami that, in addition to 
reaching a magnitude of eight or higher on the Richter Scale, may bring tsunami waves of 
eight meters or more (Wood et al., 2010, Rogers et al., 1996, Satake et al., 1996). While 
these results have a historical antecedent—the tsunami that was traced by Satake et al. 
(1996) to about 9 p.m. on the evening of January 26, 1700 using Japanese imperial 
tsunami records, geological insight, and indigenous knowledge passed down within the 
Pacific Northwest—uncertainty in this context is primarily temporal. Although a future 
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CSZ earthquake and tsunami is close to a geological certainty, significant uncertainty 
exists as to exactly when it will occur. Recently published media accounts have suggested 
that there is a 37% chance of another earthquake striking the Oregon coast within the 
next 50 years (Casey, 2015). Residents of the Oregon coast live their lives in the shadow 
of potential catastrophe.  
Responses to climate change and other catastrophic risks are not susceptible to 
purely rational analysis both because people imperfectly predict catastrophic risk (Cerulo, 
2006) and because what information they have at their disposal may be uncertain to begin 
with or not in a form conducive to use by a lay audience (Prudhomme et al., 2010). While 
the nature of catastrophic environmental change may magnify the role of contextual 
uncertainty in environmental risk, in practice risk and uncertainty are inextricable. This is 
expressed in the definition of risk used by Jaeger et al. (2010): “A situation or event in 
which something of human value…has been put at stake and where the outcome is 
uncertain.” Clearly, risks arising from both climate change and seismic events fit within 
this definition, which emphasizes the human factors that complement their geophysical or 
climatological base.  
Climate change is a “wicked problem”—a term used for problems that “have no 
easy solutions in that they are beyond the capacity of any one organization to solve” 
(Maibach et al., 2011, p. 1, Rayner, 2012). Accordingly, on a local scale it may be more 
productive to view responses to potential climate risk as the product of a multitude of 
decisions and reactions made on an institutional level, on an individual level, and within 
the interactions between these levels. Earthquake and tsunami preparedness may be 
centrally managed (Stallings, 1995) but the far-reaching consequences of the CSZ event 
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also involve a multiplicity of vulnerability concerns that should be addressed by 
understanding not only the applicable geology but also a wide variety of social structures, 
from the institutional to the local and individual (Wood et al., 2015, Wood et al., 2010, 
Tierney, 2007, Stallings, 1995). Leiserowitz (2006, p. 45) underscores the importance of 
individual risk perception in motivating appropriate social response in the climate change 
context: “Risk perception can fundamentally compel or constrain political, economic, or 
social action to address particular risks.”  
Moreover, the symbolic definitions that people associate with landscapes may 
influence both their understanding of environmental risks—from the fundamental 
understanding that a risk exists to, to its potential extent, to our formulation about how it 
might manifest—and the planning and management choices that are made in response to 
the risky event (Greider and Garkovich, 1994, Tierney et al., 2001, Tierney, 2007). In the 
context of natural disaster research, past forays into the social aspects of the effects of 
natural hazards have helped to identify additional needs that prompted the development 
of new aid programs (Tierney, 2007).  
 Keeping this in mind and recognizing the unique interactions of risk and 
uncertainty in the context of environmental change, environmental sociologists have 
studied the role of culture in risk perception, most often interrogating how it influences 
the manner in which people interpret risk (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990, Dake, 1992, 
Norgaard, 2011, 2009, Tierney, 2007). This project seeks to build upon their efforts by 
further exploring how the study of environmental risk might better embrace the 
complexities of socio-cultural systems. This would serve to partially displace the 
historical reliance on rationalist cost-benefit analysis and a unitary events-based emphasis 
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on the material reality of environmental catastrophes (Tierney, 2007). In so doing this 
research aims to enhance our understanding of the varied and often enigmatic beliefs and 
behaviors that that individuals and communities exhibit in response to knowledge of 
catastrophic risk.  
While to an extent people have individualized perspectives on the world, these 
perspectives are in part socially constructed: meaning and understanding are developed 
within the context of the variety of communities with which an individual is associated. 
These thought communities and their associated identities provide the discursive 
components that people use to envision the world around them and their relationships 
with it, providing the tools by which communities collectively make sense of situations 
and contexts (Zerubavel, 2006, 1999, 1997, Gergen, 1999, Norgaard, 2006, 1999).  
This paper surveys and synthesizes a number of theoretical perspectives from 
sociological approaches to culture, risk perception, place, cognition, and disaster in order 
to understand how residents of the Oregon coast socially construct and thus envision their 
environmental future given the persistent specter of uncertain catastrophic risk. Using this 
theoretical basis a framework is then developed to conceptualize a mechanism by which 
these risks are either addressed or ignored, providing insight into how aspects of cultural 
and cognitive sociology may be merged to explain a basis for social action or inertia.  
First, Section II consists of a brief survey of two dominant sociological 
approaches to risk that have embraced aspects of culture with greater or lesser success, as 
well as a summary of the development of risk within the sociology of natural hazards. 
Second, using Ann Swidler’s (2008, 1986) observations of the contextual deployment of 
cultural tools in “settled” and “unsettled” times, and focusing on the imperfectly defined 
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distinction between the two terms, Section III.a asks how the environmental risk might 
create unsettlement within a community. In turn, this unsettlement influences the 
deployment of cultural tools that are used to analyze, perceive, and respond to risks, 
driving ideological and social change. Applying a continuum of social unsettlement 
developed by Lizardo and Strand (2010), it suggests that recognition of future 
environmental risk may motivate unsettlement and thus the responsive thought processes 
that predict and predicate social response.    
Third, in Sections III.b - d a framework is built using developments in social 
constructionism and cognitive sociology to assess the way that communities and 
individuals living in areas that are under threat of severe adverse environmental change 
may socially develop and negotiate their perception of those risks. This analysis projects 
Eviatar Zerubavel’s (2006, 1997) work on socially developed memory of past events onto 
our understanding of future contexts in order to propose that the means by which people 
“remember” future environmental catastrophe may be socially created and mediated in a 
manner similar to shared memories. It also emphasizes the importance of place identities 
in how people remember their environmental future, drawing on the meanings associated 
with place that have been developed by historic and present conditions.  
Finally, using in-depth, qualitative interviews and data analysis conducted with 
residents of a community on the Oregon coast that is facing risks arising from both 
climate change and the potentially catastrophic CSZ earthquake and tsunami, Sections IV 
and V identify a series of discursive practices that are based in historically and 
contemporarily defined identities that members of this community use to socially 
construct their understanding of future environmental risk. In sum, the goal is to examine 
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whether the way people think and speak about environmental change as a community 
might influence unsettlement of their worldview, in light of the context of what it means 
to be part of that community.  
The community of Coos Bay, Oregon was selected as a study site due to its varied 
socio-history. This history, with a mix of industrial, resource extractive, leisure-based, 
and other associations with the coast (Robbins, 2006, Huppert et al., 2003), provides a 
richness of context that is ideal for the development of ideas about secondary and 
potentially less known aspects of environmental change and risk. Furthermore, as 
explored in greater detail below, because of this history the residents hold a diversity of 
opinions and perspectives on coastal change that have been developed through 
personalized contexts, community experience, and socially constructed narratives.  
CHAPTER II 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES TO RISK PERCEPTION 
 Over the past three decades, the two dominant perspectives within the sociology 
of risk perception have been the risk society approach associated with sociologist Ulrich 
Beck and cultural theory approach associated with anthropologist Mary Douglas 
(Tierney, 1999, Wilkinson, 2001, Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006). In order to illustrate a 
few prevailing themes within the development of social approaches to risk perception, 
these perspectives as well as a few critiques of each are outlined. Much of the value of 
these theories lies in the fact that they embrace culture as a wellspring of public risk 
perception; culture in this context acted as a counterpoint to the rote rationalist calculus 
of probability and severity often used by experts to describe risk (Tierney, 2007, 
Leiserowitz, 2006). Preferable to an actuarial approach, each of these methods has 
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provided “an indispensible means by which we may achieve a partial understanding of 
the cultural reality of risk perception” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 2, emphasis added). Yet 
neither of these approaches nor the conceptual rationales that preceded them are 
sufficient, independently or collectively, for a full appreciation of how risk is mediated 
and understood. “Risk perception,” it seems, remains “a phenomena in search of an 
explanation” (Sjöberg, 2000, p. 1).  
 a.  Cultural Theory.  
Cultural theory is based in the argument that cultural biases predispose people to 
view identified risks in different ways. Rooted in the idea that “collective representations 
of risk perform an important…function in the maintenance of social solidarity” 
(Wilkinson 2001, p. 4), it takes the view that risk is socially constructed based on three 
functional “linked domains that constitute a way of life: cultural biases, social relations, 
and behavioral strategies” (Dake 1992, p. 28). “Cultural theorists,” observe Wildavsky 
and Dake (1990, p. 43), “have proposed that individuals choose what to fear…in order to 
support their way of life….[S]elective attention to risk, and preferences for different 
types of risk-taking, correspond to…worldviews or ideologies entailing deeply held 
values and beliefs defending…patterns of social relations.”  
To this end, cultural theory tends to group individuals into categories based upon 
cultural bias (a rough expression of ideology) towards hierarchical, individualist, 
egalitarian, fatalist, and autonomous modes of social organization (Dake, 1992). This 
stands in opposition to the previously institutionalized conception of measurable risk that 
tended to produce an actuarial “hermeneutic sanitization” of risk theory, “deleting any 
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other public meanings which are not subsumable to [its] realist-risk framework” (Wynne 
2002, p. 470). 
Although they were originally conceived in the context of risk associated with 
novel technologies, Dake (1992) connected these ideologically based cultural biases to 
more environmentally focused “myths of nature.” Each ideology was linked to a 
corresponding perspective on how non-human nature and humankind interact. For 
example, adherents of hierarchical group structuring had an equivalent myth that nature is 
“robust, but only up to a point” (Dake, 1992, p. 29). Therefore, and in line with the 
hierarchicalist preference for expert opinion generally, they tend to prefer sustainable 
development directed by experts. More egalitarian individuals, on the other hand, 
“espouse the myth that nature is ‘fragile’” and take a more precautionary approach to 
environmental risks (Dake, 1992, p. 29). Supplementing cultural theory’s formation in 
the context of collective relationships and identities, it is therefore also possible to bridge 
the gap between human and environmental identities.  
Arguing for the pre-eminence of cultural theory in risk perception, Wildavsky and 
Dake (1990) outlined the influential perspectives on risk perception that preceded it: 
these focused on knowledge about risks, as well as individual personality, political 
allegiance, and economic status. They argued that despite the intuitive appeal of a 
relationship between each of these concepts and risk, cultural theory better empirically 
predicted risk preferences. For example, the correlation between greater knowledge and 
risk preferences was statistically insignificant, and the significant differences predicted 
by political allegiance were explained by its dependence on the same variables that 
formed the ideological basis of cultural theory (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). Notable about 
 9 
this is not only their conclusions, but also the resilience of simplistic explanations of 
climate response rooted solely in knowledge, personality, and political allegiance 
notwithstanding the development of more modern and empirically defensible explanatory 
models (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990, Norgaard, 2011, 2009).  
 While cultural theory is preferable to the reductionist theories that preceded it, it 
also has been critiqued on an empirical basis. In a small sample of Dutch automobile 
owners Steg and Stievers (2000) found that while the cultural biases that are represented 
by myths of nature correlate with preferences for risk management strategies, this did not 
translate into changes in behavior. Their results were “consistent with the proposition 
that…value orientations, general beliefs, and worldviews do influence specific beliefs, 
attitudes and norms, but they are not directly related to behavior” (Steg & Sievers, 2000, 
p. 264). In other words, cultural biases may influence preferences but this should not be 
taken as proof that they influence behavior: something else appears to be at work outside 
of the often-presumed causal chain from values to preferences to action.  
Sjöberg (2000, p. 6) takes this critique a step further in his review of the empirical 
evidence supporting cultural theory and other value-based scales: “the success of Cultural 
Theory is largely an example of the persuasive power of speculation.” He criticizes the 
early work of Dake as being essentially a political attitude test that relates weakly to risk 
perception. More importantly, he concludes that as a general matter value scales are 
unrelated to risk perception. In the place of cultural theory he offers a more empirically 
defensible, cognitively-based model that focuses on the importance of the “properties of 
the hazards” and personal attitude, as opposed to cultural theory’s “abstract, far-fetched 
manner” of construction of social contexts (Sjöberg, 2000, p. 9). In this view, ideology 
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specific to the individual and the precise nature of the hazard in question predominate 
over the one-size-fits-all categorical approach taken by cultural theory.    
This type of model appears to have presaged the work of Norgaard (2011, 2009), 
which focuses in part on how individualized cognitive mediation of risk influences how 
the interaction of climate information and both human and environmental identities 
translates into action. Even Dake (1992) criticized the over-emphasis of the five 
categories described by cultural theory, which was based on the assumption that these 
were the only categories of sufficient stability to represent viable ways of life. “Relaxing 
this categorical assumption,” he wrote, “does no harm to cultural theory’s core claims 
that worldviews and social relations are functionally interdependent, and it allows for a 
more sophisticated analysis of the role of belief systems and social cognition in the 
perception of risk” (Dake, 1992, p. 32).  
 Cultural theory, for all of these critiques, offers a number of points that are useful 
when applied to studies of perceptions of environmental risk. First, it recognizes that risk 
perception is socially constructed and attempted to create a plausible—if perhaps not 
empirically perfect—scale for understanding how culture affects risk perception. Second, 
while it can be criticized for its one-size-fits-all approach to culture, it also embraced a 
contextual approach to risk: “perception of danger is selective; it varies with the object of 
attention” (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990, p. 51). Third, in its very existence it supports the 
application of forms of sociological theory to environmental risk that at first blush may 
appear unrelated. For example, early discussions of catastrophic environmental risk by 
cultural theorists were influenced by ideas developed in the context of studies of 
Judgment Day developed by sociologists of religion: “where the language of sin appeals 
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to the authority of priests and divine law, the language of risk appeals to the authority of 
scientific experts and the prophetic powers of modern rationality” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 
4). Furthermore, by inviting in social cognition and belief systems Dake (1992), for 
example, helped to expand the scope of relevant theory. This work creates a precedent for 
the exploration of the application of other areas of sociology to assessments of 
environmental risk, even when such a connection may not be immediately apparent.   
 b.  Risk Society.  
 The risk society approach focuses on the contemporary breakdown of the myth of 
humanity’s rational control of the environment through a growing “realization that 
industrially produced [environmental] risks are not only human-made but also 
uncontrollable and global in reach” (Anaïs & Hier, 2012, p. 1). As a central element it 
incorporates the failure of an actuarial model of uncertainty in light of the incalculable 
scope and potential frequency of certain environmental risks (Anaïs & Hier, 2012, 
Wilkinson, 2001). The magnification of catastrophic uncertainty “triggers a reflexive, 
rule-altering (rather than enforcing) orientation to human existence that is at once global 
and experiential in scope”  (Anaïs & Hier, 2012, p. 1). Beck sought to relocate discourse 
on our relationship with environmental risks within a future marked by a salient threat of 
“self-annihilation” (Wilkinson, 2001) that forces reflexivity by “propel[ling] modern 
[people] into ‘self-confrontation’ with the consequences of risk that cannot be adequately 
addressed, measured, controlled, or overcome, at least according to the standards of 
industrial society” (Elliott, 2002, p. 297).  
 Elliott (2002) further distinguishes Beck’s concept of risk in modernity from how 
it was understood in earlier, more traditional societies. First, he describes Beck’s 
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conceptual distinction between “danger or hazard” as understood by traditional societies 
and “risk.” Risk involves an element of “instrumental rational control” that was 
evidently, in Beck’s view, absent in many traditional societies; whereas hazards and 
danger were a regular part of life, risk arises only from “an attempt to make the 
incalculable calculable” (Elliott, 2002, p. 298). The upshot of this is that, in Beck’s view, 
individuals living in the present day are required to become more intimately involved 
with risk analysis rather than merely deferring to tradition or established norms (Elliott, 
2002).  
The critique that follows questions whether it is possible to draw such a fine-line 
distinction between traditional and modern societies, and further questions whether 
Beck’s reliance on a “rationalistic and instrumental-calculative model of risk in micro-
social and macro-social worlds” is appropriate (Elliott, 2002, p. 300). Among other 
conclusions, what emerges from this attempt “to stress the sociologically questionable 
assumptions concerning risk in Beck’s work” and “to tease out the more complex, 
nuanced, forms of risk perception” is an argument that Beck underestimated the 
resilience of tradition in his description of reflexive modernization. Whereas Beck 
viewed reflexive modernization as a “revising, or reinvention, of tradition,” Elliott argues 
for a more static view of the nature of traditional roles and ideologies in the field of risk 
perception (Elliott, 2002, p. 308). Therefore a tension emerges between the roles of 
reflexivity and deference to tradition, but each in its own way embraces the role of the 
individual and the local in risk perception.  
Elliott (2002, p. 300) also posits that Beck’s model has “deep affinities with neo-
classical economics and rational-choice theory, and thus necessarily shares the 
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conceptual and political limitations of these standpoints.” It may therefore stand to reason 
that a summary of later criticisms of the risk society thesis “imply…that Beck’s theory 
cannot grasp the hermeneutical, aesthetic, psychological and culturally bounded forms of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity in and through which risk is constructed and perceived” 
(Elliott, 2002, pp. 300-01). 
Like Elliott, Wilkinson (2001) questions Beck’s approach to individuals, but this 
time in the context of the effects of the media on the risk consciousness of the public. The 
risk society approach directs that the development of public risk consciousness is heavily 
influenced by the communications media. However, Beck appears to have ignored what 
is known in communications studies as the “impersonal impact hypothesis, which 
suggests that people separate issues identified by the media as problems for society from 
those which they identify as a problem for themselves” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 13). Thus it 
is important to not conflate the perception of a personally problematic form of risk with a 
perception of a publicly problematic form, and to approach risk from the standpoint of 
the individual and the subject community.  
 While it would be infeasible to interrogate the full breadth of elaborations and 
critiques of the risk society approach here, from this brief review a few important 
observations emerge. Buried within risk society is a tension between traditional ways and 
ideological revision that is based not in an interpretation of risk, but in the very existence 
of risk as a describable modern concept. This also incorporates a tension about the extent 
to which tradition is resilient in the modern world and to what extent individual risk 
culture is the product of institutional forms or individualized (or otherwise localized) 
concern. Problems also emerge due to the emphasis that Beck places on the individual in 
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risk perception, ignoring some of the ways that risk is constructed within the complex of 
individual and community (Elliott 2002). As with cultural theory, an argument can be 
made that adherent of the risk society approach “fail to give due consideration to the fact 
that a partial perspective on the social reality of risk perception is woefully inadequate for 
conceptualizing the complexity of the cultural dynamics through which people negotiate 
the meaning of their world…[and] that this is to neglect a component of our 
understanding of social reality which may be vital for explaining the rise of ‘the risk 
debate’ in the public sphere of modernity” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 16).  
When viewed in combination with cultural theory a few additional common 
themes emerge. First, both schools of thought agree that culture matters and risk 
perception is, in some way and to some extent, socially constructed. While risk society 
may be more closely related to rational choice theory, along with cultural theory it 
reflects that risk is partially the product of the social world. Second, it is likely that no 
approach based purely off of one paradigm—cultural theory, risk society, or economic 
rationality—is sufficient to explain the range of responses to risk. Third, an over-reliance 
on any one approach runs the risk of minimizing the importance of context and nuance in 
individual or local-level responses to risk perceptions. 
c.  Approaches to Risk in the Natural Hazards Literature.  
Risk is also addressed in the natural hazards literature. In a 1999 description of 
the history of the treatment of risk in this literature, Kathleen Tierney notes “that the 
complex issues regarding the study of risk” had “yet to develop a coherent theoretical 
framework from which to study hazards” (Tierney, 1999, p. 216). Commenting on the 
dearth of information produced within this field that might prove useful to the study of 
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hazards, she describes Beck’s work, with its exclusive focus on “risks associated with 
technology in contemporary industrialized societies” as saying “almost nothing about 
natural hazards, which is troubling for those of us who see natural and technological 
disasters as having common sources” (Tierney, 1999, p. 216). She views the reason for 
this omission—Beck’s distinction between technological hazards, about which he 
emphasizes the role of human decision-making in the name of progress, and natural 
disasters, which he views as not having a strong human decisional component—as 
representing a false dichotomy. Alternatively, she views natural disasters (or at least the 
effects thereof) as being “as much the result of decisions as those related to technology” 
(Tierney, 1999, p. 216).  
She also discusses the development of cultural theory and psychological 
approaches to risk that depend in part on the cognitive shortcuts people take in risk 
assessment. This approach may illuminate “the ways in which risk perceptions of 
laypersons differ from the estimates offered by experts and from objective, empirical 
data” (Tierney, 1999, p. 218). Critically, she observes that the “net effect of this line of 
research has been to make individual and group perceptions a central consideration in the 
study of risk in the social sciences, to the neglect of other topics” (Tierney, 1999, p. 218). 
Seeking to remedy this disciplinary failing, she proposes analysis that extends beyond 
basic perception, incorporating social construction as well as organizational and 
institutional analysis. This would serve the purpose of understanding of “the views 
people hold on hazards, and the social production and allocation of risk” (Tierney, 1999, 
p. 219).  
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Importantly, another line of thinking recognizes that natural hazards risk is 
dynamic as a result of the dynamic nature of human decision-making. The production of 
knowledge about risks, therefore, is grounded in systems reflective of existing systems of 
power and institutional interests. Instead of social construction operating to diminish the 
institutional approach, the “argument that risk estimates are social constructs leads 
logically to the question of why particular risk estimates are selected and legitimated, 
rather than others” (Tierney, 1999, p. 222). Rather than adhering to the argument that 
“risk estimates merely need to be further refined so that they more closely reflect reality” 
she argues that “more relevant to this field is the study of processes through which risk-
related phenomena are socially defined” (Tierney, 1999, p. 236).  
With respect to the CSZ earthquake and tsunami, social issues have recently 
gained prominence in the geology literature but fail to address the full breadth of issues 
identified by Tierney (2007, 1999). For example, Wood et al. (2010) have developed a 
geospatial technique that uses census-block tracts to identify relative overlap of areas at 
high risk of loss of life from a tsunami and those with particularly vulnerable populations. 
This measure of social vulnerability is based on a number of discrete demographic factors 
such as wealth, age, employment, gender, and race. Building off of this base, in a follow-
up study Wood et al. (2015) added the critical factor of the amount of time it would take 
to evacuate local tsunami zones.  
Without diminishing the importance of work such as this that seeks to incorporate 
social vulnerability into hazard assessment, it is important to note that it employs 
methods of understanding social vulnerability that paint with a broad brush and are 
focused primarily on the needs of emergency managers and public education and 
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outreach. This is reminiscent of what Tierney (2007) critiques as a “command post” point 
of view that deemphasizes local context. On the other hand, it represents a move away 
from what she terms the “events based” perspective that tends to divorce the study of 
disasters from their social context. Extending this embrace of the social, an opportunity 
arises for the development of approached to natural disaster risk that embrace 
developments in other sociological fields and advance their application into the realm of 
environmental change.  
CHAPTER III 
 
NOVEL LOCALIZED APPROACHES TO RISK OF CATASTROPHIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 
 
Since both cultural theory and risk society are best viewed as necessary yet 
insufficient contributions to our understanding of risk perception, following Tierney 
(1999) the question then becomes whether other aspects of cultural sociology might 
inform our understanding of how natural disaster risk is socially constructed and how it 
translates into action. For example, Norgaard (2011, 2009) studies the ways in which 
climate change denial is socially organized as an emotional protective mechanism. To 
this end, she utilizes the concept of a cultural “toolkit,” originally described by Swidler 
(1986) to explain how individuals employ pre-existing cultural tools—endowments of 
ideology, skills, and habits, including those drawn from various identities—to interpret 
and affectively manage knowledge about climate change. In many cases this affective 
management acts as the impetus for climate change denial in action, even among groups 
of people who do not deny the anthropogenic nature of climate change (Norgaard 2011, 
2009).  
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This work, however, focuses on how the tools provided to people by “culture can 
provide resources for constructing strategies of action,” not on the details of the processes 
that motivate resort to cultural tools in the first place (Norgaard 2011, p. 11). This is not a 
critique. Instead, it emphasizes that the process of social settlement and unsettlement that 
Swidler (1986) describes as the lynchpin for the shift from the maintenance of tradition 
and a normal commonsensical way of doing things to the shift in ideology and strategies 
of action, have not been fully explored in the context of environmental risk.  
a.  Toolkit Theory: The Potentially Unsettling Nature of Environmental 
Change. 
 
In this section a method will be described by which the potential effects of 
catastrophic events may give rise to the feelings of unsettlement that Swidler has 
described as causing the ideological and behavioral shifts through which people organize 
their behavior (Swidler 1986, Lizardo & Strand 2010). While in Swidler’s terms a 
relative feeling of settlement or unsettlement triggers the resort to the repertoire of 
cultural tools that have been developed socially and culturally, this effort seeks to identify 
whether the array of cultural endowments within a community influence whether the 
community feels unsettled in the first place, and if so in what way? Stated another way, if 
the potential for catastrophic environmental change—meaning socially constructed risk—
can unsettle, how do the cultural and social endowments of a community influence the 
development of unsettlement, as well as the modes by which unsettlement comes to be 
felt? In this way risk perception might not be only the product of ideology or tradition (as 
cultural theory and risk society suppose) but generative of a tendency to maintain 
tradition or to resort to strategic ideological update in the first place. This will develop an 
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understanding of the potential motivational effects of a sense of impending 
environmental catastrophe. 
 Swidler (1986, p. 281) argues that “[c]ulture affects actions, but in different ways 
in settled versus unsettled periods.” In settled times people tend to rely on tradition and 
common-sense approaches to living their lives. Unsettled times, however, trigger a 
deeper ideological searching and the development of new ideologies that compete for 
social resonance as people develop novel “strategies of action.” She rejects the “‘unit 
act,’ the notion that people choose their actions one at a time according to their values or 
interests” as well as pre-existing theories that assumed a rational and pre-planned 
deployment of a set of tools from scratch based either on social experience or the then-
existing context (Swidler, 1986, p. 276).  
Instead, she describes something of a loose assemblage of cultural tools derived 
from varied individual experiences and ideologies that people (and their communities) 
employ to create strategies of action for daily life (Swidler, 1986, Schudson, 1989, 
Vaisey, 2009, Lizardo & Strand, 2010). This distinguishes her approach from a rationalist 
perspective like the one that arguably underlies risk society and those that inarguably 
underlie other common approaches to disaster risk, and tends to confirm the belief of 
cultural theory’s critics that values may not predictably translate into action.   
 Yet Swidler never concretely defines unsettlement, nor identifies precisely what 
might distinguish settled from unsettled times. Instead, she provides an example of how a 
slow accretion of scientific information that runs contrary to established “knowledge” 
may eventually reach a tipping point and trigger a paradigm shift in the form of a 
scientific revolution. This example, however, is inconsistent with her assertion that 
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settled and unsettled times exist on a gradient; social transformation in her view does not 
occur with the flip of a switch and an expert announcement of “unsettled!” Each of these 
challenges are faced by researchers focusing on climate change and other environmental 
disasters:  
Distinguishing culture’s role in settled and unsettled periods, we can focus 
on those historical junctures where new cultural complexes make possible 
new or reorganized strategies of action. We can then ask how concrete 
structural circumstances affect the relative success of competing cultural 
systems (Swidler, 1986, p. 283). 
 
The question of what distinguishes settled and unsettled times couples with the 
more basic question of whether cultural tools can serve a motivational purpose at all. 
Some of Swidler’s successors have interpreted the use of cultural tools as being purely 
for the purpose of justifying prior action (DiMaggio, 1997) while others argue that 
cultural tools can also serve a motivational function (Vaisey, 2009). Reviewing Swidler’s 
approach, Vaisey (2009), a proponent of a motivational role, notes that Swidler (2001) 
found that human beings are “remarkably bad at giving consistent reasons for their 
behavior” and, while cultural tools might constrain motivation—demotivating individuals 
from undertaking strategies of action for which they have insufficient social justification 
or cultural tools—Swidler “seems to realize that a needed account of motive is missing” 
(Vaisey, 2009, pp. 1678-79).   
Attempting to remedy Swidler’s intentional or unintentional focus on the use of 
culture as justification rather than motive, Vaisey (2009) reframes the issue in the context 
of the dual modes of human cognition: the deliberative and automatic minds. Using the 
metaphor of an elephant on a rider, he contends that although the rider—the thoughtful, 
deliberate mind—might feel in control, the elephant—the automatic, intuitive mind based 
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in some sort of cultural value system—is really in control. He contends that this serves a 
simplifying function: the deliberative mind simply could not contend with the 
overwhelming array of information it receives and decisions it would be forced to make 
based on that information. Instead, the human mind tends to default to automaticity based 
in values (Vaisey, 2009). This is oddly consonant with a regular complaint in the climate 
change context: that the production of overwhelming amounts of climate information acts 
as an impediment to responsive action (see, e.g., Oregon Coastal Management Program, 
2009).   
Yet in response to Vaisey, Swidler (2008) reiterates her belief that people are 
more likely to act in ways that reflect the skills with which culture has endowed them—
their cultural tools—than their values. More importantly, she queries the elephant 
metaphor for the purpose of questioning whether people have some sort of inherent 
value-laden moral intuition: “who or what trains (or indeed feeds or tends) the elephant 
over time? Without some substantive notion of where the intuitive judgments that…shape 
conduct come from…asserting that there are such judgments still says…nothing about 
the role of culture in shaping action” (Swidler, 2008, p. 617). The question of motivation, 
therefore, may come down not to deterministic intuition based on values, but on some 
other form of cultural input. Given this intellectual tension, taking a slightly different 
approach to Vaisey provides a clue about the avenue by which automatic cognition might 
embrace a motivational role in the environmental context: preservation of ontological 
security through the preservation of identities (Vaisey, 2009, Jaeger et al., 2001).  
Developed relatively contemporaneously with the toolkit approach, ontological 
security refers to “the confidence that most humans have in the continuity of their self-
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identity and the constancy of their surrounding social and material environments of 
action” (Jaeger et al. 2001, pp. 15-16, emphasis added). It provides, for Vaisey, support 
for the idea that “unconscious dispositions” may play a role in developing a “sense that 
the world is [a] meaningful and stable” place (Vaisey, 2009, 1682 emphasis added). 
Importantly, ontological security’s dual focus on meaning and stability elegantly reflects 
the nexus between sense of place and place identities—how people imbue physical and 
social spaces with meaning (Gieryn, 2000)—and the potential effects of environmental 
risk that threaten expectations of a predictable environmental future (Norgaard, 2011). 
Place identities and sense of place, which are discussed in greater detail below, merge the 
human and the geophysical and reflect a sense of constancy in both the social and 
physical world.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly the ability of climate change risk—once perceived and 
recognized—to challenge ontological security has been described by Norgaard (2011) as 
one of the drivers of the emotional protective mechanisms that induce climate denial. It is 
intriguing to consider that environmental risk may in other ways (outside of the realm of 
affective mediation) consciously or subconsciously work to motivate change that either 
confirms or modifies existing social and environmental identities, and thus support or 
challenge ontological security and relative feelings of settlement.  
Place and other identities, in turn, may influence both the tools available for 
deployment and the relative sense of unsettlement that that is felt based on the potential 
environmental change and risk through a challenge to local place-based ontological 
security. Thus environmental change and its potential to motivate based on a collection of 
identities fits neatly into the contention that the deployment of cultural tools should be 
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viewed as “having an unconscious component [intuition]…and a conscious component 
(our discursive ‘identity projects’)…[in order to] see how identities can be thought of—
without contradiction—both as motives and ‘cultural tools’ that we can ‘pick up and put 
down’” (Vaisey, 2009, p. 1707). 
However, linking environmental, social, and individual identities and allowing for 
the existence—albeit imperfectly defined—of a motivational use of culture and identity 
does not address the central question here: do the risks associated with future 
environmental change potentially set the stage for use of cultural tools in the first place? 
Indeed, it appears that Vaisey (2009) is still discussing the “back end” approach to the 
employment of cultural aspects of risk—what happens after a determination of settled or 
unsettled—instead of looking at a “front end” approach that considers how perceptions of 
risk might influence the initial calculus of relative unsettlement. Put simply, while 
Norgaard (2011) demonstrates that place identity may play a role once culturally-bound 
retooling has started as a result of unsettlement, questions remain about the full range of 
factors that can initiate the process of social change itself by creating, enhancing, or 
reducing unsettlement.  
Lizardo and Strand (2010) provide the link that provides the necessary means of 
analysis of the “front end” role of risk perception. This occurs as part of an attempt to 
integrate Swidler’s toolkit approach with aspects of Pierre Bourdieu’s strong practice 
theory, particularly his ideas about how embodied social structures are produced not 
through discourse but by being “encompassed by” a certain social environment. “This 
results in the acquisition of a ‘taste’ for exposure to similar experiences at an…ultimately 
motivational level” (Lizardo & Strand, 2010, p. 211). Similarly to how peoples’ 
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apparently idiosyncratic choices “can be shown to be anything but idiosyncratic” but 
based on social position, they theorize that Swidler’s observations about the problems 
people encounter in giving consistently good reasons for their behavior arise from their a 
priori lack of knowledge about appropriate behavioral criteria to deal with a new 
situation: they lack “explicit institutional prescription” for their actions (Lizardo & Strand 
2010, pp. 214-15). Like Swidler and Vaisey, they “recognize the fact that persons are 
simply unable to report coherent accounts of the reasons why they engage in certain 
courses of action” (Lizardo & Strand, 2010, p. 205); this belies the argument that courses 
of action are based in a rationalist, deliberative approach.  
Lizardo and Strand (2010, p. 216) use this observation about the level of 
institutional direction and cultural support—which they term “socio-cognitive 
scaffolding”—to develop a framework that distinguishes between relatively more and 
less settled contexts, which is described in greater detail in Table 1.  
Furthermore, they do so in a manner that extends motivation beyond the 
automatic cognitive realm described by Vaisey and into the discursive consciousness 
(which they describe in tandem with the more automatic practical consciousness). More 
settled contexts are those in which there are relatively greater scaffolding. These are 
broken down into contexts in which behavior is heavily prescribed or directed—in these 
contexts tradition and common sense take the fore in shaping choices—and less 
prescribed contexts that exist between the “gaps” in social expectation where actors tend 





Table 1. A Representation of the Stages of the Breakdown of Socio-Cognitive Scaffolding. 
 
 Discursive Consciousness 
Level of Prescription or 
Recognition and Resulting 
Behavior 
Practical Consciousness 








Strong External Prescription 
Quiescent, reliance on and cognitive 
exploitation of objectified institutional 






Gaps in the institutional order 
Active, “cognitively optimal” use of already 
existing and widely shared vocabularies of 
motive, reliance on “institutional myths” to 
explain action; loose coupling or 
“dissociation” between justifications for 




“Ontological complicity” between 
embodied habits and skills and 
objectified institutional orders, 
unconscious schematic transfer 
across institutional domains. 
 
 
Gaps in the institutional 
order 
Production of globally coherent 
lines of action through “regulated 
improvisation” in unstructured 
choice situations; criteria of 
judgment refractory to discursive 
consciousness and hard to 








Early (before reflexive recognition) 
Continued reliance on existing vocabularies 
of motive, cognitively optimal attempts to 
explain away anomalies. 
 
Late (after reflexive recognition) 
Reflexive, “cognitively costly” search for 
and possible development of novel explicit 
cultural patterns (“ideologies”), rule-based, 
consciously monitored schematic transfer 
across institutional domains. 
 





Late (after reflexive recognition) 
Retooling/retraining/acquisition of 
new habits and skills/readjustment 
of future expectations. 
 
Imported and adapted from Lizardo and Strand (2010, p. 216). 
 
Where such scaffolding becomes less stable or non-existent the context gradually 
shifts into the realm of unsettled, which is divided into an early stage and a late stage. 
The early stage precedes full reflexive recognition of the unsettling circumstances and is 
marked by discursive attempts to “explain away anomalies” and a “false anticipation of 
the future…because the environment [people] encounter is too different from the one to 
which they are objectively adjusted” (Lizardo & Strand 2010, pp. 216, 221). This is 
followed by a later stage that is triggered by the recognition of unsettling circumstances, 
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at which point the difficult processes of cultural retooling and ideological reshaping 
originally described by Swidler (1986) commence (Lizardo & Strand, 2010). In other 
words, settlement and unsettlement in the context of risk may be better viewed not solely 
as the product of recognition of the risk itself, but also whether the risk fits within 
conceptions of normal circumstances for which people have established responses. In 
sum, they describe their elaboration on Swidler as: 
We have substituted Swidler’s “settled” versus “unsettled” binary for our 
current (and we believe analytically more precise) distinction between 
contexts in which actors can rely on externalized, stable cultural 
scaffoldings, and thus exploit the existing structure to guide their behavior 
by engaging in cheap, cognitively optimal heuristics at the level of 
discursive consciousness, and contexts in which this external scaffolding 
is absent or non-existent (e.g. periods of institutional change or 
transformation) and which reliance on more “cognitively costly” reflexive 
cognition becomes necessary. We have also differentiated between two 
kinds of “unsettled” based upon the timing and reflexive recognition of the 
agent that the taken-for-granted cultural scaffolding is still there or not. 
(Lizardo & Strand, 2010, p. 216, internal citations omitted).  
 
This analysis serves a number of important functions in the context of the 
sociology of environmental change. First, this elaboration of the stages of relative 
unsettlement harmonizes the heretofore-apparent contradiction in Swidler (1986) between 
gradual movement from settled to unsettled and her example of a tipping point triggering 
a paradigm shift. Instead of there being a discrete moment of social transformation it is 
described as a process occurring over the course of time. This reflects the creeping 
catastrophic nature of climate change, as well as the potentially catastrophic yet 
temporally uncertain nature of earthquake and tsunami. 
Second, this analysis provides an intuitively appealing rationale for the gradual 
divisions in American society that have been described by surveys focused on climate 
change values, attitudes and beliefs (see, e.g., Leiserowitz et al. 2013, 2008). For 
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example, a denialist who sincerely disbelieves the existence of climate change based on 
prior political or cultural commitments would likely remain settled (as what neither exists 
nor is perceived cannot unsettle) and therefore, per Swidler, only resort to common sense 
and established tradition to guide action. Moving across the gradient of climate change 
perspectives examples of regulated improvisation, attempts to explain away anomalies, 
false expectations of the future, and ideological update ranging from recycling to 
radicalization spring immediately to mind.  
It is intriguing to consider that Lizardo and Strand’s (2010) ideas could be used to 
create a systematic explanation for how perceptions of local environmental risk motivate 
the recognition of various states of change and reactions ranging from active and literal 
denial, to apathy, to individual or movement-based environmental activism.  In this way 
it serves as a strong reminder that sociological thought may be extended into the 
environmental realm notwithstanding that it was developed to address other issues.  
This is particularly salient because the blurry line between “settled” and 
“unsettled” is based on a mismatch of associative probabilities of an event occurring in 
reality and as it would be predicted based on past experience (Lizardo & Strand 2010): 
this reflects a state of uncertainty that only requires the addition of something of human 
value to be at stake to create risk (per Jaeger et al., 2001). Assuming a lack of 
institutional direction about how to approach the potential effects of environmental 
change—and this is more of a certainty in many contemporary communities than the 
effects of environmental change itself—uncertainty will inevitably lead to probabilistic 
mismatch except in the case of the most ardent denialist. In this way, a changing 
environment may implicate “previously developed modes of perception and appreciation 
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[that] are applied under circumstances when they are no longer objectively appropriate” 
(Lizardo & Strand, 2010, p. 221).  
This is additionally important based on Cerulo’s  (2006) argument that human 
beings are far better able to grade good outcomes and envision the best than they are at 
grading outcomes below a certain predetermined point of “unacceptable.” This “positive 
asymmetry” of perception causes us to be the worst at envisioning worst-case scenarios 
(Cerulo, 2006). In combination, it is possible that people will not only apply older 
responsive schemes to new situations even when due to the inherent uncertainty in 
climate change there is no “objectively” appropriate local response. Moreover, even 
when some metric exists that is objectively useful for the development of responses to 
catastrophic environmental change, such as those proposed by Prudhomme et al. (2010) 
or Wood et al. (2015), people would have difficulty appreciating how to apply those 
metrics to a potential worst-case scenario.  
Thus Lizardo and Strand (2010) provide a theoretical basis for the argument that 
risk perception—via a mismatch in historically expected and actual environmental 
outcome—may act as a trigger for a gradual conversion from “settled” to “unsettled” 
times. Their approach provides an appropriate framework that allows for both gradual 
social change and an eventual tipping point of social transformation. This conversion 
includes the direction of elements of behavior, therefore addressing the observation that 
early forays into the cultural aspects of risk perception may help to explain beliefs, but 
not action. Moreover, they incorporate a “front end” motivational role of risk perception 
that may produce effects on both a discursive level and a more automatic level (Lizardo 
& Strand, 2010). Finally, it is worth noting that the concept of a mismatch of historical 
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and future probabilities that they import from the work of Bourdieu reflects the way that 
increased risk of flood and other environmental catastrophes are expressed: for example, 
a past 100-year flood event (or a one percent annual probability) is often be expressed 
after taking into account climate change as a 20-year, 10-year, or 5-year event (a rough 
correlate of a 5%, 10%, or 20% annual chance, respectively).  
b.  Cultural Tools Derived From Place: Place Identities.  
While the foregoing discussion treated cultural tools in broad terms, it is 
worthwhile to explore potentially relevant sources of cultural tools that may assist in 
tracing the development of environmentally bound unsettlement.  Two related areas of 
environmental sociology relevant to the question of what cultural tools are available to 
members of the public are sense of place and place identities. Each of these may impact 
levels of settlement and how a community reacts to more or less settled times. Sense of 
place and place identities are, in a basic sense, ways of expressing and measuring the 
feelings, meanings, and attachments that people develop in light of the physical attributes 
and social attributes of an environment, as those attributes are socially constructed  
(Greider & Garkovich, 1994, Gieryn, 2000, Motloch et al., 2000, Gustafson, 2001, 
Manzo, 2005, Stedman, 2011, Lin & Lockwood, 2014). In analyzing place, weight 
should be given both to a place’s geophysical features and to the social meanings 
produced within them (Stedman, 2011). These meanings are neither static nor unitary, 
nor are they deterministically derived from their physical or social attributes of a place. 
Instead, Manzo (2005, p. 81) observed that in her study of residents of the New York 
metropolitan area “many places [became] meaningful through a steady accretion of 
experiences in them” and people “developed multi-faceted relationships with places that 
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sometimes transcended physical boundaries and coalesced around personal, emotional 
experiences.”  
Importantly, notwithstanding that places may appear to be mundane or a mere 
backdrop to social life, they are generative of the thought processes that help to constitute 
identity: “Relationships to places reflect…their particular journey in the world….The 
places that people deemed important enabled them to sort out their thoughts and feelings, 
to work out their identity, to dream and to grow” (Manzo, 2005, p. 82). Indeed, people’s 
“stories about significant places serving as bridges to the past support the notion of 
continuity over the lifepath,” yet discontinuities and the effects of politics on place were 
also deemed important (Manzo, 2005, p. 82). Put another way: “Place saturates social 
life: it is one medium (along with historical time) through which social life happens” 
(Gieryn, 2000, p. 467). Yet Manzo (2005) emphasized the need to focus not only on the 
positives but also on potential negative associations with place, notwithstanding the 
apparent inconsistency between negative feelings and the often-used term “place 
attachment” (see also Trentelman, 2009). 
Gieryn (2000, p. 481) suggests that due to the ubiquity of effects of the physical 
environment “sociologists should perhaps add place to race, class, and gender as a 
wellspring of identity, drawn upon to decide just who we are in an already unsettled 
way.” Place is not only generative of personal and community identities. Place and 
human identities are optimally viewed as recursively generative of each other:  
Cultural groups socially construct landscapes as reflections of themselves. 
In the process the social, cultural, and natural environments are meshed 
and become part of the shared symbols and beliefs of the members of the 
groups. Thus the natural environment and changes in it take on different 
meanings depending on the social and cultural symbols affiliated with it. 
As a group’s definition of itself—the very essence of what it is to be 
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human—is renegotiated, so too is the definition and conception of the 
environment. (Greider & Garkovich, 1994, p. 8, emphasis added).  
 
These feelings, however, do not exist in the ether. While it may be tempting to 
view social approaches such as these as invitations to dismiss the material environmental 
reality the meanings that underlie these factors both reflect material conditions and can 
express themselves materially over time. For example, Motloch et al. (2000) provide a 
vehicle for understanding how places develop distinctive and resilient characters and 
traditions that are based in part on their material endowments. The processes by which 
place character and tradition develop, bind, reconstitute, and recreate place and 
community identities in recursive fashion are based on historical conditions as well as 
their effects on decision-making over time. Through these structures, they create a 
“methodology for understanding the etiology of place distinctiveness: how places achieve 
coherence and how that coherence reproduces itself” by empirically tracing the historical 
development and reproduction of these elements (Motloch et al., 2000, p. 792). This 
historical perspective embraces the “diverse intertwining” of factors that create place 
distinctiveness: economics, “sentiment and symbolism,” culture, and others, while at the 
same time rejecting perspectives dominated by an economic engine or those based too 
heavily in sentiment and symbolism, instead focusing on an “action based and more 
comprehensive view” (Motloch et al., 2000, pp. 792, 794).   
They develop two mechanisms that support place distinctiveness, as well as 
mechanisms for measuring them: lash-up, which is based in actor-network theory and is 
empirically traced by place character; and structuration, which involves the social 
reproduction of the tradition of a place over time as structures are built based on the 
priorities and constraints of its pre-existing character. “‘Tradition’ stands in for how that 
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character transforms over time—how a mode of conjuncture at one point constrains or 
enables a particular mode of conjuncture at the next” (Motloch et al., 2000, p. 793).  
They conducted a lengthy analysis of the historical differences in the development 
of the cities of Santa Barbara and Ventura, California notwithstanding that each 
community has similar ecological endowments. While each had access to oil and 
beachfront, they outline how Nineteenth Century decisions about whether to emphasize 
the importance of oil or leisure-based economies were recreated and reinforced over the 
intervening decades, leading to Ventura’s contemporary industrial character and Santa 
Barbara’s character as the playground of the wealthy. Therefore the tradition of a place 
may be understood as its character as that character moves through time and recreates 
itself in modified form (Motloch et al., 2000).  
Reflecting on these processes, Motloch and his co-authors offer an addition to 
how place character may interact with contemporary notions of hegemony and power: 
For local individuals and groups with only weak resources, the weight of 
accumulating conjunctures, and the routines they imply, set the terms for 
adjustments that must be made—however unhealthy, inegalitarian, or 
otherwise troubling these adjustments are….It is not that a particular set of 
substantive and stable ideas ‘take hold’ in a place…but rather that so much 
can and does occur as people react to arrangements that appear 
normal….Given persistent hierarchies of wealth and ideological control in 
places, reproduction requires all local actors to make adjustments, drawing 
on conceptions of place that have so durably come down. People live 
within the accustomed modes of things coming together, acting towards 
them as “going concerns”…naturalizing them as we now say. Such 
arrangements are further ratified through the assumption that others will 
presume and act similarly. Individuals, as Bourdieu…remarks “become 
the accomplices of the processes that tend to make the probable a reality” 
(Motloch et al. 2000, p. 817, emphasis added).  
 
It is important to bear in mind that place identities, whether couched in the 
descriptive terms of character, tradition, distinctiveness, or otherwise, are not simply the 
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result of social accident based on inputs over time that tends to reflect hegemonic 
structures. The development of place identities—and especially those related to industrial 
or strong economic interests—may be influenced by material conditions and may be 
strongly and directly influenced by those in power (Bell & York 2010). This influence 
may not reflect the contemporary economic importance of the industry to the place: for 
example, Bell and York (2010) mention the maintenance of a logging identity in the 
Pacific Northwest even as employment derived from logging declined, and describe 
active efforts by the coal industry in West Virginia to maintain a coal identity even as the 
importance of mine-based employment waned. Place identities are thus best understood 
as a constellations of meanings that are developed over time, may be developed 
automatically or deliberatively, and reflect the full range of human interaction with the 
environment (including, in many ways, that environment’s human components).  
In addition, Motloch et al. developed, in the context of power and hegemony over 
the development of place over time, an idea similar to the automaticity in the face of 
overwhelming information development that Vaisey (2010) recognized as central to 
organizing thought. Their resort to tradition as an attribute of a settled existence, and the 
desire to maintain a sense of normalcy as people make decisions, is also similar to the 
framework provided by Swidler (1986), as elaborated upon by Lizardo and Strand 
(2010). As is discussed in greater detail later, the social construction of identities through 
reflections on historical conditions and recognition of contemporary contexts may both 
set the stage for development of community identities and preferred topics of discourse, 
and may reinforce the same (Zerubavel, 2006, 1997). Identities of place and the 
communities that occupy that place are thus closely linked and mutually interdependent, 
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and each is dependent on place, its material reality, and the social construction of the 
realities of the people that inhabit it.  
The dual importance of historical and contemporary identities in how people 
create and ma intain place identity to understand the nature of their environment is 
particularly important in Coos Bay given its resource extractive past—with an emphasis, 
although non-exclusive, on logging—and the recent gradual decline of the economic 
importance of logging in favor of other factors. These new factors, including tourism and 
transfer payments from retirees, may be just as environmentally dependent as resource 
extraction due to their basis in the areas aesthetic potential, although that dependence 
expresses itself in different ways (Robbins, 2006, Huppert et al., 2003). The same may be 
said for other attributes of place identity such as identification as a small town featuring 
relative safety, or as a place inhabited by groups of people who adhere to different 
ideological priorities. In any case, it is important to recall that tradition—the point of 
origin for changes in strategies of action described in Swidler (1986) and Lizardo and 
Strand (2010)—exists as a dynamic reflection of the character of a place and the 
meanings that character encompasses for its residents.  
c.  The Social Construction of Uncertain Environmental Change. 
 
With the perception of future environmental risk now potentially occupying a 
generative position within a framework of social responses to catastrophic environmental 
change, the operative question becomes how risk of future and often uncertain 
environmental change is socially constructed. Social construction is the process by which 
“material realities gain meaning through social interaction” (Pettenger, 2007, p. 6).  
Framed more simply, in this context it is an attempt to expand upon the pure material 
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realities of environmental change to analyze how they are understood by potentially 
impacted people through the exchange of ideas and thought (Gergen, 1999, Pettenger, 
2007). This does not deny the importance of material reality; rather, it emphasizes that 
the way in which people understand their world is dependent both on material reality and 
on how we describe, explain, or represent such realities as part of human relationships 
(Jaeger et al., 2001, Gergen, 1999). It therefore makes sense that place identity 
encompasses both the underlying geophysical reality and the social aspects of its 
construction.  
In practice, these social relationships may manifest in the amplification or risk or 
its attenuation. Whether risk is amplified or attenuated can occur through selection of 
messages and ideas that are consistent with previously held values and beliefs and may be 
personal or the product of group association: “Individuals in their roles as members…of 
social groups…do not follow their personal values and interpretive patterns alone, but 
perceive risk information according to the rules of organizations and groups with which 
they are associated” (Jaeger et al., 2001, p. 172). Thus, the basic way that we conceive of 
material reality, and our assessment and interpretation of risks that it presents in and 
individualized or group context, is fashioned by our social relationships, allegiances, and 
communication within these boundaries (Gergen, 1999, Jaeger et al., 2001). Social 
constructionism of this sort has also been applied to the study of disaster: 
The social constructionist approach to disasters, which is related to the 
constructionist perspective in the social problems literature…argues 
against viewing disasters as objective physical phenomena with given 
properties and impacts [and instead focuses on how] defining and labeling 
hazards and disasters…are socially produced through organized claims-
making activities (Tierney et al., 2001, p. 17).  
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The early history of a social constructionist perspective in earthquake studies—
primarily the work of Stallings (1995)—focused on organized claims-making activities at 
the institutional level by disaster professionals such as scientists and government 
functionaries (Tierney et al. 2001). “In the virtual absence of public concern,” notes 
Tierney (2007, p. 508), “the interests of [these actors] converged in the 1970s, resulting 
in at least the partial construction of earthquakes as a social problem.”  
Much of the value of these contributions was based in their support for a shift 
away from a single-faceted events-based approach by placing emphasis on the 
multiplicity of social and environmental factors that affect planning and response, 
including the social conditions in which “disasters themselves originate” (Tierney, 2007, 
p. 509). Yet notwithstanding the importance of this development, the disaster scholarship 
that followed has been criticized for an emphasis on the “command-post point of view 
[that] privilege[es] the disaster narratives of official organizational informants over those 
of victims and community based groups” and ignores, to a degree, social justice concerns 
embedded within these communities (Tierney, 2007, p. 515). Outside of the earthquake 
field, similar efforts to understand the social construction of climate change related risks 
have commenced to “illustrate changes in values, identities, interests, strategies, and 
policies that a focus on material forces alone cannot explain” (Pettenger, 2001, p. 12, 
Norgaard, 2011).  
Discussing the next steps in the development of the sociology of disaster, Tierney 
(2007, p. 519) argues in favor of a shift towards the development of sociological theory 
through disaster research, instead of only applying theory developed in other fields to 
disaster, and for greater disciplinary linkages both within sociology and without: 
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Disaster research can be linked with any number of sociological 
specialties and theoretical orientations; the possibilities are endless. 
However, perhaps the most logical initial strategy is to develop more 
productive interchanges with close neighbors—that is, with other 
specialties that explore social phenomena that resemble or overlap with 
disasters. Chief among these specialties are the study of risk, 
organizational research on accidents and disasters, and environmental 
sociology. This is not a call for more middle range theory; rather, it is a 
call for extensive efforts to overcome the conceptual gerrymandering that 
has hampered larger-scale theory development. 
 
The study of risk is itself a multidisciplinary field that focuses on disaster-
relevant topics such as risk perception, the social construction and social 
amplification of risk, risk assessment, and risk management, both in 
specific societies and in cross-societal and comparative contexts…. 
 
Calls for expanding the interdisciplinary purview of the sociology of disaster are 
not merely focused on the development of theory. Early forays into the social 
construction of disaster produced tangible policy results: “[a]s new negative disaster 
effects were constructed, additional needs were identified, and new aid programs often 
followed” (Tierney, 2007, p. 507). Gergen (1999) argues that the maintenance and 
development of cultural traditions and relationships “depends on a continuous process of 
generating meaning together” in order for “traditions to remain sensible.” He then mirrors 
the contention that social constructionism can support tangible results:  
At the same time, constructionism offers a bold invitation to transform 
social life, to build new futures….If we long for change, we must confront 
the challenge of generating new meanings, of becoming poetic 
activists….Invited are generative discourses, that is, ways of talking or 
writing…that simultaneously challenge existing traditions of 
understanding, and offer new possibilities for action. (Gergen, 1999, p. 49, 
emphasis in original).  
 
With an eye towards developing a new theoretical framework based in a localized 
social construction of risk, as applied through the lens of the sociology of culture, it is 
essential for a poetic activist to understand how communities and individuals 
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characterize and understand risk by resort to cultural traditions. In this way it may be 
possible to better understand how these narratives and discourses interact with the 
material reality of disaster and how, through the amplification or attenuation of the sense 
of risk, they may influence unsettlement and therefore calls for revision of strategies of 
preparatory action.  
In the context of Coos Bay, however, an additional complication emerges: that the 
risks presented by climate change and earthquake are contingent and uncertain as to 
scope, magnitude, and timing. Accordingly, the material environmental reality of this 
context directs that any analysis of social construction must focus on how individuals 
and communities create narratives and discourses about anticipated future events using 
what they know and believe, which on an individual or community-wide basis may or 
may not accurately reflect the state of the art in scientific understanding of these events. 
In this sense, it is critical to recognize that, while it is indeed important to understand 
what people know and whether it accurately reflects applicable science, it is also 
important to empathetically endeavor to understand what people believe and why they 
believe it, particularly if this belief contradicts science.  
All predictions of the future involve an element of subjectivity; this re-emphasizes 
and reinforces the importance of empathetic assessment of what people know and 
believe in order to discover how these processes influence planning and preparedness 
activities. This is not the same as questioning the necessity or validity of the science. As 
described in the sections that follow, understanding of the predictions of scientists only 
provides the foundations for perspectives on environmental change: while these 
foundations are indeed critical for the structural integrity of the complex as a whole, 
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they often do not tell us much about what the complex looks like or its pattern of 
habitation.  
d.  Remembering the Future: The Social Construction of Future Events.  
The way that people process and create memories is the product of social 
environments and interactions. Using ideas developed in the field of cognitive sociology 
of perception, memory, and denial, it is possible to develop an argument for how the 
social construction of the future is analogous to the ways in which we remember past 
events at which we were not present, but that are important for our communities. This 
process, which I term “Remembering the Future,” is based in large part on the work of 
cognitive sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel (2006, 1997). While autobiographical memory 
refers to events at which an individual was personally present and can relate the events 
from a first hand perspective. Zerubavel (1997) describes people’s collective memory of 
events at which they were not present as socio-biographical memory. Events captured in 
socio-biographical memory are “remembered” through the “mnemonic communities” to 
which an individual belongs (Zerubavel, 1997, pp. 90-91).  
Socio-biographical memories are not limited to events in which all of some of the 
members of a community were present. In contrast, and as opposed to firsthand accounts 
of events personally experienced, they mediate more spatially or temporally distant 
events that affect the subject community. They may express themselves in “the sense of 
pride, pain, or shame we sometimes experience as a result of things that happened to 
groups or communities to which we belong before we even joined them” (Zerubavel, 
1997, pp. 90-91). These “socially mediated memories…are based entirely on secondhand 
accounts of others” and are influenced both by pre-existing identities and the form of 
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information that is available to be passed on, be that oral tradition, recorded versions of 
events, or otherwise (Zerubavel, 1997, p. 90). They allow communities to interact with 
their collective past are both the product of, and generative of security in, community 
identity (Zerubavel, 1997).  
An example of how people remember events based in secondhand narratives or 
information is our experience with the events of September 11, 2001. Many people who 
were not present at the World Trade Center on that day still have a socio-biographical 
memory of the events that occurred there. They can recite facts acquired secondhand or 
describe visions of destruction passed through the media even though they were 
thousands of miles away. Moreover, it is not only members of communities with concrete 
ties to affected areas that share these memories, and it is plain to see from that most basic 
Google search that different communities, even in the United States, have formulated 
different narratives of those events based on pre-existing social and political 
commitments. It is also evident that those experiencing and remembering those events 
may be dependent on a multiplicity of communities of thought created by different means 
of cognitive socialization (Zerubavel, 1997).  
It is important to distinguish individual memories from the related yet distinct 
concept of collective memories. While individual memories are certainly subject to 
cognitive filtering in terms of what they emphasize and minimize, “the collective 
memory of a mnemonic community…includes only those [memories] that are shared…” 
and are thus influenced by mnemonic conventions of the group as a whole (Zerubavel 
1997, p. 96).  Thus, in understanding collective memories it is critical to distinguish 
between those memories held by an individual or perhaps a few people, and those held 
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and commemorated collectively. When many people share the same freely associated 
memories of a particular event or concept (i.e. associating particular presidents with the 
concept of “American history”) “it…underscores the tremendous significance of 
mnemonic socialization” (Zerubavel 1997, p. 96).  
It would be a mistake to take an essentialist approach that elevates the primacy of 
material reality, community structure, or individual traits such as personality in the 
creation and maintenance of narrative. Likewise, it would be a mistake to assume that 
narratives formed socially within a community are somehow insulated from identity and 
behavior. Somers (1994, p. 618, emphasis in original) describes what she terms 
“ontological narratives” as being, “above all, social and interpersonal” existing 
“interpersonally in the course of structural and social interactions over time.” 
[U]sed to define who we are; this is turn can be a precondition for 
knowing what to do. This ‘doing’ will produce new narratives and hence 
new actions; the relationship between narrative and ontology is processual 
and mutually constitutive. Narrative location endows social actors with 
identities–-however multiple, ambiguous, ephemeral, or conflicting they 
may be (hence the term narrative identity)….Ontological narratives 
process events into episodes. People act, or do not act, in part according to 
how they understand their place in any number of given narratives—
however fragmented, contradictory, or partial (Somers 1994, p. 618, 
emphasis in original).  
 
These ontological narratives are based in part in what some term “tradition” but Somers 
(1994, pp. 618-19) describes as “public narratives”: “those narratives attached to cultural 
and institutional formations larger than the single individual, to intersubjective networks 
of institutions, however local or grand.” Without much theoretical stretching place may 
be added to this list of applicable identities.  
Within the domain of ontological narrative and related public narratives lie the 
keys to a number of the theoretical frames previously discussed. Narrative—the stories 
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that people within a community tell, and more importantly the stories they believe—help 
to constitute the ways that people conceptualize the world in which they live. Nor, in a 
manner reminiscent of Swidler (1986) and the more recent history of natural hazard risk 
studies, is action necessarily based in rational calculation or some sort of categorical 
assumption about personality differences. Through reconstitution of ontology it appears 
that narratives have the capacity to unsettle, provided that new narratives challenge 
ontological stability. The subject identities found in a community are also bound into this 
matrix; but like the narratives themselves it dispenses with the requirement that multiple 
identities or narratives be internally coherent or consistent. Therefore, it is important to 
remember that place identities and community and personal identities may be related and 
mutually constitutive, with the full breadth of social relations potentially subject to 
emplacement (Gieryn, 2000, Greider & Garkovich, 1994).  
Individuals and communities thus construct memories of past events at which 
they were not present, and often events that took place long before they were born, 
through mnemonics and narrative. Rather than be sterilely tucked away into the recesses 
of the mind as a mere story, the narratives that communities develop affect action and the 
material future reality within which a community will find itself. Furthermore, that 
“narratological pluralism often generates discord…reminds us that our memory of the 
past is not entirely objective….[y]et [that] mnemonic battles usually involve not just 
individuals but communities…suggests that the past is not entirely subjective either” 
(Zerubavel, 1997, p. 99). The similarity of this intersubjective approach to the mixture of 
material reality and social construction in the analysis of future disaster is unmistakable.  
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Accordingly, it is intriguing to consider that this analysis of how we socially 
negotiate memory of past events—through a combination of objective and subjective 
factors—may also apply to future events, at which no one has yet been present. This is 
because individuals and communities have already constructed narratives based on 
available scientific—or non-scientific, as the case may be—information. Could this 
“memory” of future events bind and reinforce community identities just as memories of 
past events can? This concept—remembering the future—requires analysis not only of 
the stories told by individuals, but analysis of stories or thematic types of stories that are 
shared by multiple community members.  
Even putting aside for the moment the direct effects of political and similar 
commitments, the narrative analysis of memories of the future is complicated in the 
present circumstance by the fact that this analysis necessarily involves what is left unsaid. 
In a later work, Zerubavel (2006) analyzed the social construction of silence and denial 
through social negotiation of appropriate and inappropriate topics of conversation, as well 
as the means by which communities create and reinforce these discursive boundaries. 
Arguing that what we socially avoid was at that time an undertheorized area, he begins by 
recognizing the difference between the private act of noticing something and the public 
act of acknowledging it. Denial—and the related concept that he terms a “conspiracy of 
silence”—involve a mixture of individual and collective effort and is based in the 
avoidance of trauma, fear, or shame (Zerubavel, 2006).  
Like the mnemonic construction of memory, what we choose to ignore or deny is 
also dependent upon a combination of personal factors and adherence to community 
norms. These are based on relative passively applied rules of relevance or irrelevance that 
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determine whether something is noticed in the first place, more active rules that 
determine what is acknowledged and what is ignored, and other rules that determine what 
we consider noteworthy versus what is deemed background noise (Zerubavel, 2006). 
“Separating the ‘relevant’ from the ‘irrelevant’ is a sociomental act performed by 
members of particular social communities who are socialized to focus only on certain 
parts or aspects of a situation while systematically ignoring others” (Zerubavel 2006, p. 
25, emphasis in original). Through social processes familiar to all, such as taboo and tact, 
such mores are preserved, as is the negative disquiet that may be expected for their 
violation (Zerubavel, 2006).  
Denial goes one step further than the mere act of conspiring to maintain silence 
about a verboten subject or event. Meta-denial is the process of “denying the denial” by 
refusing to converse about the existence of denial in the first place. “Unlike when we 
explicitly agree to not talk about something…the very fact that that the conspirators avoid 
it remains unacknowledged and the subtle social dynamics underlying their silence are 
thus concealed (Zerubavel, 2006, pg. 52-53). A number of discrete factors are identified 
as influencing the likelihood that an individual will participate in such a conspiracy. First 
is the proximity of the individual to the subject matter of denial. Second are the level of 
social proximity between potential conspirators and the level of political difference 
between them. Closeness in each of these categories implies greater trust, and thus a 
reduced tendency to resort to denial (Zerubavel, 2006).  
Yet the factor “that most dramatically affects the likelihood of participating in 
conspiracies of silence is the actual number of conspirators involved” (Zerubavel 2006, 
pg. 54). This is because “it is psychologically much more difficult to trust one’s senses 
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and remain convinced that what one sees or hears is actually there when no one else 
around…seems to notice it” (Zerubavel 2006, pg. 55). By means of feedback between 
members of a community, denial and silence are thus self-reinforcing until someone 
breaks the conspiracy of silence by “making the…presence [of the previously avoided 
topic]…part of the public discourse” (Zerubavel 2006, pg. 55).  
Among the reasons that individuals choose to maintain conspiracies of silence are 
altruism and the avoidance of isolation through preservation of group cohesion. 
Altruistically, people may recognize that breaking conspiracies of silence may threaten 
the “cognitive tranquility” of their peers, upsetting them by potentially unsettling their 
worldview (Zerubavel 2006, p. 74). Similarly, disruption of social systems through 
disclosure of this type of information can potentially alienate the former conspirator from 
the group and disrupt group cohesion. Interestingly, maintenance of denial can also create 
a sense of isolation borne from the dissonance between what a person observes and what 
their community acknowledges. This results in “large amounts of social energy [being] 
consumed in our effort to avoid noticing or speaking about them,” a process that can both 
undermine group cohesion and create dysfunction (Zerubavel 2006, p. 83). 
Although he specifically focuses on denial and conspiracies of silence, what 
Zerubavel (2006) was discussing more generally were norms of conversation and 
discourse and how they influence the generation and preservation of information. 
Coupled with his investigation into the operation of socio-biographical memory and the 
observation that our perception of future events is necessarily at least partially subjective, 
I argue that the way in which appropriate discourses are developed for how people 
“remember” the future of environmental change are similarly socially constructed and 
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determined. Zerubavel (2007, p. 58) himself alludes to the same in the context of denial, 
arguing that silence is how an entire society may come to “collectively deny…impending 
environmental disasters.” Furthermore, the narratives through which memory operates 
and that influence the rules of discourse through which memories of the future are 
produced and socially supported are the product of the basic way by which people imbue 
their place with meaning by reference to antecedents grounded in history and identity. 
The way these future memories are constructed can unsettle by multiple means: 
acknowledging risk can of course unsettle through fear of the risk itself but evidently 
denial of risks can also unsettle, although by the different mechanism of social disruption. 
This complicates the analysis of a gradual process of unsettlement based on 
acknowledgement of environmental risks based on Lizardo and Strand (2010), because it 
suggests dual sources of unsettlement based in somewhat opposing modes of dialogue. 
More importantly, the melding of these ideas in the context underscores that discourses 
and narratives matter both to collective understanding and to the creation of a collective 
in the first place. What remains unsaid or is filtered through socially generated rules of 
discourse may be just as relevant to the way that people think about what has not yet 
happened as what is said. Changing the subject or its frame away from one matter and 
towards another is therefore a powerful discursive tool that is not only a matter of taboo 
tact, also one of power (Zerubavel 2006).  Remembering the future, then, is not only a 
process of what we endeavor and agree to remember and commemorate, but what we also 
conspire to misremember or forget.  
Following both the calls to better integrate disparate disciplines within sociology 
in the context of environmental disaster, and the desire to better analyze local nuance in 
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risk perception, in this study I develop a number of mechanisms by which members of a 
coastal community who are cognizant of a chance of severe environmental risk socially 
construct the way that they remember the future by reference to the past and the present. 
The concept of future memory has been developed using Zerubavel’s (2006, 1997) 
thoughts about the intersubjective and subjective development of memories about events 
at which the memory-holders were not present.  
Moreover, I analyze how an assortment of these processes have led to discursive 
divides in the community that reflect both personal perspectives and a milieu of local 
place identities grounded in, and driven by, historical and contemporary conditions. 
Tracing what is said is also a means of tracing what remains unsaid: discursive 
modifications can alter the overall thrust of discourse. In many ways this is a study of 
discursive displacement. How do discourses displace the unsettling nature of the material 
reality of environmental catastrophe and how might the deployment of “chunks of 
culture” (Swidler, 1986, Lizardo & Strand 2010) influence the development of these 
unsettlement-mediating narratives? Overall, the goal of this analysis is to better 
understand how members of a community facing two types of potentially adverse 
environmental change create, negotiate, and maintain their understanding of this change, 
and how that understanding may influence the choice to resort to responsive preparation.  
CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
This project employed certain techniques based in grounded theory, particularly 
its emphasis on open-ended interviews and allowing collected data to influence the 
direction of research. Grounded theory embraces the co-development of data and theory, 
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in the sense that qualitative interviews are used to determine response patterns that invite 
and direct further development of theory (Charmaz, 2006). In line with the vision of 
Tierney (2007), the overall purpose of this process has been to identify means by which 
members of local communities socially construct their vision of future environmental risk 
and uncertainty, employing questions focused on both climate change and earthquake 
risk.   
a.  Participant Recruitment. 
Over the course of the summer of 2015, in-depth, qualitative interviews were 
conducted with 25 residents of Coos Bay, Oregon, and its immediately surrounding 
locales. Participants were recruited using snowball sampling that began with approaching 
a number of community service organizations. With particular assistance from one 
chapter of one such organization, participants were recruited and were invited at the end 
of each interview to suggest other people who they felt had a strong sense of the local 
community and would be willing to participate. Partly due to the demographics of 
members of this particular club, however, it soon became apparent that my sample group 
was skewing towards relatively affluent men over the age of 50. Accordingly, in order to 
include a range of perspectives reflective of a more demographically diverse group, I 
actively sought participants from less-well represented groups by emphasizing this 
concern while asking for referrals as well as by seeking out an additional organization 
that offered a more demographically diverse membership to assist with recruitment.  
This led to contacts within the local chapter of an organization focused on outdoor 
recreation and environmental stewardship who provided assistance in approaching 
members; working with this organization resulted in a significant balancing of age and 
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gender in the participant sample. The final participant cohort consisted of 12 males and 
13 females. Participant ages ranges from 29 to 70 years old, with a mean age of 51.4 and 
a median of 56. Nine participants were under the age of 40, ten were between the ages of 
40 and 64, and six were aged 65 years or older. All interview participants reported that 
the Coos Bay area was their place of year-round residence at the time of the interview. 
The average length of residence or at least a strong association with the area (i.e. as 
evidenced by home ownership, even if the area had not always been a full time residence) 
was 22.2 years, with a minimum of two years, a maximum of 66, and a median of 20. 
Five participants had lived in the area for less than ten years, seven for between 10 and 19 
years, four for between 20 and 29 years, six between 30 and 39 years, and three for 40 
years or longer.  
Six participants were born and raised in the area or at least spent significant time 
in the area prior to adulthood. For those who had moved to the area, the reasons were 
diverse and often complex. For example, some participants came to the area originally for 
one reason yet decided to stay in the area for an entirely different reason, or gave multiple 
reasons for the decision. In addition, some participants may have originally decided to 
move to the area or to stay there for one reason, but subsequently have developed an 
appreciation for other aspects of the area that demotivated any desire to leave. The 
primary reasons why people moved to the community or decided to stay there involved 
an appreciation for natural recreation and amenities or for employment. This was 
followed by an appreciation for a small town feel—as one participant put it an “acoustic 
version” of big city life—and family obligations. 
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Although Coos Bay is overwhelmingly white at 87.1% (United States Census, 
2010), and no question focused on race, a few participants mentioned how they identify 
racially (one Latina, one of Asian descent) and I believe that the sample is at least 
somewhat consonant with the overall racial makeup of the area. That said, a significant 
regret is the evident lack of any participants from the local American Indian tribes; 
although some participants may have identified as members of these tribes no mention 
was made of this during the interviews. In future research I would like to include a 
broader diversity of ethnic and racial perspectives notwithstanding that this may require a 
restructuring of the interview process. 
A second weakness in capturing the full diversity of the community involves 
socio-economic status. The title of William G. Robbins (1998) fascinating history of 
Coos Bay—Hard Times in Paradise—underscores the potential importance of economic 
hardship in the area and future research should also endeavor to engage with a more 
representative socio-economic sample of the community. As of 2010 about 18% of the 
population of the city of Coos Bay lived below the poverty line (United States Census 
Bureau, 2010), and participants often mentioned the level of poverty and its associated 
social ills. Perhaps incident to the privilege that is sometimes bound together with 
community service and more generally free time—one taxi driver who I approached for 
an interview declined by explaining that he spent 12 hours per day working—I believe 
that my sample may have been inordinately focused on the more affluent.  
A 2000 survey described by Huppert et al. (2003) indicated that 68% of 
respondents in the Coos Bay area were unemployed or retirees. Although this data is 
difficult to apply because it aggregates retirees and the otherwise unemployed in an area 
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with a large number of retirees, and because local demography may have changed in the 
intervening 15 years, it suggests that the fact that in my study all participants described 
themselves as employed or retired may be problematic. This was despite efforts to 
approach and discuss these matters with participants from other socio-economic groups. 
In some cases these efforts were successful. Furthermore, a number of participants who 
might rightly be described as affluent discussed less affluent times in their lives.  
While six participants reported that they were retired and none of those were born 
and raised in the area, only four of those were in the cohort aged 65 or above. The 
remainder of the study participants reported a diversity of employment including non-
profit managers and small entrepreneurs, fishers and cooks, consultants, and workers in a 
number of other fields including tourism, public health, medicine, business, education, 
and science. This final category was particularly interesting, as five participants either 
were working or had worked professionally as natural scientists and three more reported 
scientific training notwithstanding a vocational focus other than scientific research.   
The choice to use organizations focused on community service in recruitment was 
made to help ensure that participants had, first, a particularly strong sense of community 
and potentially well-developed reflections on matters deemed to be of importance to the 
community, and second that they had assumed leadership roles in the community. Many 
community leaders from the fields of politics and government, business, community 
service, and local economic development were interviewed, as were a host of local 
professionals who had made significant personal commitments to the community and 
seemed intimately aware of the panoply of issues it faced. However, to avoid the 
“command post” bias described by Tierney (2007) I endeavored to avoid the temptation 
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to focus solely or even primarily on individuals who were active in local politics or who 
were otherwise professionally involved in emergency management.  
The interview participants described a wide range of life experience and 
expressed a wide range of political and social viewpoints across the spectrum of 
American life. Often these viewpoints contradicted absolutist stereotypes present in 
contemporary political discourse. For example, many participants might rightly be 
described as environmentally and socially liberal, yet expressed views of the appropriate 
role of government and government spending that trended towards conservative. 
Accordingly, and notwithstanding the demographic issues previously noted, this study 
incorporates a diversity of opinion from a number of different, and often overlapping, 
communities of thought that are found in this community on the coast.  However, it is 
worth remaining mindful that the process of recruiting through these organizations may 
not have offered a perfectly representative sample of the population of coastal 
communities in general, nor of the Coos Bay community as a whole, and no such claim is 
made. 
b.  Interview Structure.  
The interviews were structured to first, discuss participants’ history in the 
community, including length and type of residence (i.e. seasonal or full-time), 
employment history, what drew them to the community or motivated them to stay in the 
community, other places they have lived, whether they like the community, how they 
define their community itself, and outside communities with which they have strong 
connections. Identifying their definition of community was embedded in a method in 
which questions about the community were presented without any initial direct inquiry 
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into how the community is defined. This tacit exploration of community was intended to 
allow participants to define their community or communities fluidly, as opposed to 
designing questions suggesting a single or even a set array of types of community. This 
section was intended primarily to assess what the participants view their communities to 
be and to provide background about the development of the participants’ opinions and 
outlook.  
In an effort to understand participants’ sense of place and identities associated 
with place, a second set of questions focused on their interactions with the surrounding 
natural and built environments, and the feelings and meanings they associate with the 
local area and environment. As with “community,” the questions avoided predetermined 
definitions of terms like “environment” or “area” to allow participants to embed their 
definition of each term and the subjectivity attached to these definitions in their answers. 
Clarification was only sought if the definitions of these terms were not clear from the 
initial responses. Through this process participants could express the meanings that they 
associate with the local environment, be they social, personal, economic, aesthetic, or 
otherwise, while minimizing the effects of prompting on outside assumptions. 
Accordingly, these responses often were reflective of their interactions with the 
environment and how they imbue physical and social spaces with meaning.  
Participants were also invited to discuss whether they thought that their 
viewpoints were shared by others, as well as the substance of conversations about the 
environment among themselves and others in the community who either agreed or 
disagreed with their views. This was intended to assess patterns of meaning—whether 
abstract or embedded in more tangible observations about use or value—that were held in 
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relation to the local place and environment (however they happened to define these 
terms). A final line of questioning attempted to connect their observations with their 
understanding of the most important moments in local history, to get a sense of how each 
participant viewed the historical development of the area.  
Following the question about significant historical changes, a final set of 
questions addressed perspectives on contemporary and potential future change along the 
coast. As with the previous two sections, this line of questioning began with an open-
ended approach to change and uncertainty, which gradually became more focused on 
physical environmental change. This was intended to help analyze the salience of 
different forms of change and uncertainty; for example, some participants chose to 
respond to the initial question about coastal change with descriptions of their reasons for 
optimism or pessimism about economic development while others spoke about 
demographic shifts in the population while still others spoke about change to the physical 
environment.  
Questions in this section were intended to shed light both on what participants 
know or believe about the material reality of environmental change, but also how they 
interact with potential changes. Later in the interview process, after the salience of the 
CSZ earthquake and tsunami had been recognized, a question was added that inquired as 
to the length of time that the participant had been aware of the possibility of this event. A 
final question inquired about their views on who is responsible for planning and 




c.  Transcription, Coding, and Analysis.  
While interviews varied from about 30 minutes to 90 minutes, a vast majority of 
the interviews were between 45 and 70 minutes in length. Each interview was transcribed 
and coded, first by means of an open coding process in which participant responses were 
assigned a code, followed by a more focused coding process in which coded statements 
were organized into categories based on the general focus of each. These codes were 
analyzed and placed into conceptual categories for further analysis of meaningful 
relationships within and between these categories. Coding produced 16 conceptual 
categories that covered a broad range of social and environmental perspectives and 
included a number of subordinate codes. These categories were then analyzed for internal 
discursive consistency or inconsistency, as well as interactions with other categories. 
Because coding categories often overlapped and influenced each other, special attention 
was paid to the interaction and overlap between coding categories. 
 d.  Development of Project Focus Over Time.  
 Initially this project was designed to assess perspectives on environmental change 
through a climate change lens only, and how sense of place and place identity influenced 
these perspectives. Analytical variability was intended to be grounded in perspectives that 
focused on what was assumed to be the more familiar risk of climate change related 
flooding, and the presumably less familiar risk of potential releases of toxic substances 
from terrestrial industrial sites as a result of that flooding. It soon became clear that while 
generalized coastal flooding was indeed familiar, so too were problems with terrestrial 
toxins washing into the Coos Bay estuary! Accordingly, early in the interview process it 
became evident that perspectives on these two climate-change related events were quite 
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similar and the effort to think of the two in terms of different levels of familiarity would 
likely be fruitless.  
Fortunately, the flexible nature of the interview design accommodated the desire 
of participants to discuss a different and apparently more salient topic than climate 
change: the potentially catastrophic CSZ earthquake and tsunami that is overdue on the 
Oregon coast. Coos Bay is littered with evidence of official concern about a tsunami in 
the form of blue evacuation route signs. During the spring and summer of 2015 the issue 
gained a greater public profile due to a number of media reports. In April, in an article 
titled “Tsunami poses risk to almost 100,000 on West Coast,” CBS News picked up an 
academic article published by Nathan Wood of the United States Geological Survey and 
his colleagues that outlined the threat to the Pacific Northwest coast, as well as cultural 
and other impediments to effective preparedness (Casey, 2015, Wood et al., 2015).  
This was followed in July by an article in The New Yorker magazine titled “The 
Really Big One” that brought greater public awareness to the issue (Schulz, 2015) and 
another CBS News article that stated that “[s]eismologists predict [that the CSZ event] 
will be the worst natural disaster in North American history” (Kashdan, 2015). Finally, in 
October Oregon Public Broadcasting (OPB) premiered a documentary on the earthquake 
and tsunami threat, as well as the lack of coastal preparedness; in keeping with the 
growing tradition of subtlety avoidance, it was titled “Unprepared” (OPB, 2015).  Yet 
these issues resonated beyond the sphere of coastal residents and the media: after only a 
few visits to the coast I found that I had developed a constant awareness of the most 
efficient route to high ground.  
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It was therefore unsurprising that when asked about change to their physical 
environment the minds of residents of Coos Bay migrated to the earthquake and tsunami, 
but this salience was not solely the result of recent media coverage. Many study 
participants were strikingly familiar with local geology, explaining processes such as the 
possible liquefaction of the marsh fill on which some of the City of Coos Bay—which 
was originally known as Marshfield—is built, that in their view will compound the 
destructive effects of the earthquake and tsunami. At this point a second question 
developed: how to understand how people who recognize and understand this risk 
continue to live in an area that has been widely reported to have a 37% chance of the next 
big one occurring within the next 50 years (Casey, 2015)? The inclusion of the threat of 
earthquake also introduced significant variability between the more incremental nature of 
climate change risk and the rapid catastrophe of the CSZ earthquake. Moreover, this 
variability extended to the differences in range of expected material realities that will 
manifest, and in the different levels of politicization of climate change and earthquake 
discourse. While it is not a goal of this project to compare and contrast these patterns of 
politicization, the extra variability may serve as a control of sorts for the way 
perspectives on environmental change writ large are reflected upon discrete events.   
An additional change in the project focused on the treatment of sense of place and 
place identities. The initial interview prompts focused on sense of place and place 
identity were modeled after the Stedman’s (2003) analysis of place satisfaction and 
attachment that focused in part on the sociality of places, as well as Anthony et al.’s 
(2009) description of the economic, inspirational, aesthetic, and tacit values that are often 
associated with coastal areas. These analyses focused not only on the levels of 
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satisfaction of different part of their environments, but also the nuance of meaning 
through which people build their complex associations with place. While this project still 
inquired about these associations, this overall analytical focus quickly became subsumed 
by the strong local associations with historically developed identities derived from 
resource extractive economies.  
Accordingly, the project again shifted from a frame of reference in which 
economics and aesthetics were considered separately to one in which the historical and 
contemporary economics of making a living permeated conversations about nearly every 
other subject. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these resource extractive identities—this term was 
chosen rather than logging identity because of a long history of multiple types of resource 
extraction including fishing and shellfishing, as well as mining for coal, nickel, 
chromium, and other materials—and the economic systems that they support also 
influence, albeit in different ways, many of the observations about perceptions of future 
environmental change. Without diminishing the importance of aesthetics—particularly 
because interview responses evidenced that satisfaction in this context often arose out of 
the natural beauty of the area—the focus on identity shifted to a more unitary focus on 
the historical economic experiences of the area.   
CHAPTER V 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 This cohort of residents of Coos Bay and its surrounding environment evidenced a 
relatively high level of environmental sensitivity and awareness. All were aware of the 
risk of climate change and the risk of an earthquake and tsunami as general concepts 
(meaning that they had heard of these potential risks), but employed four methods of 
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discursively understanding future risk. While these four likely do not represent a 
comprehensive inventory of all discursive approaches to risk employed by the 
community, each arose with surprising regularity and represented a dominant mode of 
discourse. The first, which I term environmental determinism, is somewhat at odds with 
the other three. Marked by internal inconsistency in how it translates to action, 
environmental determinism is a pessimistic and minority view that is principally 
associated with earthquake and tsunami risk. It appears to be based primarily in an 
understanding of warnings provided by scientists and public authorities without much, if 
any, changing of the narrative subject from a causative material reality and its effects on 
people.  
Opposing this view and creating a discursive split are methods of symbolic 
discourse that tend to de-emphasize risk by situating them within their historical and 
environmental context, although in different ways. The first two, the symbols of isolation 
and self-reliance and the symbols of preparedness, are associated primarily with 
memories of future earthquake and tsunami risk and draw heavily upon participants’ 
historically-grounded place and community identities. The symbols of isolation and self-
reliance draw from a deeply felt portion of the local identity that derives from a sense of 
geographic and social isolation within the community. This sense of isolation is 
countermanded by a narrative of rugged self-sufficiency that is derived from the history 
of Euro-American settlement of the area and the boom and bust cycles of its economic 
history. It serves to shift the frame of discourse and therefore the way that the future CSZ 
earthquake is remembered from one of geophysical determinism to one situated 
experience and human resilience.  
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The symbols of preparedness involve a shift of the frame of discourse from 
environmental determinism to one of human involvement through various personal and 
community-based preparedness plans. These plans involve a modicum of personal choice 
and agency within the context of institutional entreaties to be prepared for catastrophic 
risk. Without expressly denying future risk, this vision of the future shifts the narrative 
content of conversation away from the potentially destructive effects of environmental 
events by emphasizing individual and community agency in preparation.  
The fourth discursive category, analogy to the familiar, is more closely associated 
with the risk of climate change related flooding than the CSZ earthquake and tsunami. It 
develops as people envision future climate change flooding risks by analogy to the winter 
flooding that is relatively commonplace on this section of the coast. Study participants 
tended to think of flooding as a regular and normal part of their lives given recent and 
historical experience; in this frame it only represents a negligible cost that is secondary to 
other community concerns. This is easily distinguished from perspectives on flooding of 
the type that is expected to be incident to the CSZ tsunami.  
Furthermore, analogy to the familiar manifests in another way within the context 
of the localized effects of climate change. Expected changes to the local weather have 
prompted a sense of economic optimism among some participants. This tendency, termed 
the Napa North analogy, is based in the hope that climate change will bring warmer and 
sunnier summers that would in turn foster increased tourism and the residential settlement 
of the wealthy. In light of the economic tribulations endured by this community in the 
wake of the decline of the timber and other industries, this reflects the widely expressed 
hope that tourism can serve as a contemporary way to marshal the area’s striking natural 
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beauty for economic gain. Community residents used each method to understand and 
describe future environmental risks and from their widespread use it is evident that these 
form a portion of the way that the community conceptualizes these environmental risks. 
While they are each related in some ways, they tend to be used in different ways and 
draw from different sociomental and cultural repertoires.  
Yet it would be a mistake to draw hard categorical distinctions between each 
group as they sometimes overlap and influence one another. This overlap and the 
resulting lack of perfect categorical clarity and distinction should be expected in any 
complex social context. Accordingly, the four categories are intended solely as analytical 
tools to understand approaches to how people remember the possibility of future risk on 
the coast. As will be outlined, each process exists on a continuum of public concern that 
roughly maps the continuum of social unsettlement provided by Lizardo and Strand 
(2010). In this way, it tends to extend the application of their ideas into the field of 
environmental change. To protect the identity and confidences of the study participants, 
in this paper each has been assigned a pseudonym and other details that might allow 
identification have been modified.  
a.  Environmental Determinism.  
Although this is a minority viewpoint, it is useful to start off—like the early 
history of natural disaster studies—among people who are strongly influenced by their 
understanding of the material reality of risk. Before proceeding, however, a couple of 
caveats are in order. First, this analysis is cabined completely within the earthquake and 
disaster, as no participant related stories or conversations about potential climate change 
risk that evinced a sense of powerlessness towards its impact on local human 
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communities in the near future in the same forceful manner that was typical of 
descriptions of the CSZ event. The one account of climate change that might be viewed 
as determinist also emphasized the temporally remote nature of its effects on people.  
Consequently, no one considered making any significant life changes based on 
expectations of increased storms, flooding, or the other potentially adverse consequences 
of climate change. Quite the contrary, mixed with a slight sense of distant worry there 
was a countervailing sense of optimism about the local effects of climate change based 
primarily in the potential for it to attract tourism and wealthy climate refugees, if not 
about its more global repercussions.  
Second, within the context of the CSZ event, there was no indication that those 
who did not express primarily deterministic feelings about the earthquake and tsunami 
were ignorant of their potential effects. In fact, a generally high level of knowledge about 
the potential effects of the CSZ event among survey participants belied the idea that the 
level of knowledge may be the root cause of greater or lesser levels of unsettlement. 
Environmental determinism in this context implies that environmental risk to people—
either the participants as individuals or their communities—will be the determining factor 
in how future risk manifests. In some cases, however, there was a sense of resignation 
about the inevitability of the CSZ earthquake absent strong personal concern.  
For example, Richard, a retired businessman, not only knew of the tsunami threat 
to the coast but also could pinpoint where on Route 101—a major thoroughfare—“the 
ground dropped 30 feet and caused huge tsunamis that were recorded in Japan and China 
back in the 1700s.” Yet immediately after he continued “but I don’t think that’s a fear 
thing, our biggest environmental risk” before concluding that forest fires and their effects 
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on the local economy through tourism were more important. Similarly Corrie, who had 
moved back to the area 18 months prior to the interview and expressed a sense of 
“coming home,” said about the earthquake risk: “I think it’s inevitable, it is what it is so, I 
feel, I can’t really feel good or bad about it, it’s just what it is.”  
Amy, a professional in the tourism industry who had moved to the area 15 years 
before and served as a community booster, related that “the…thing that could be a huge 
change is when the [tectonic] plates go like that, and we get a tsunami like they’re telling 
us” before nervously laughing that “I don’t know how that’s going to turn out.” Yet 
moments later, while describing a training video she watched about similar earthquakes 
in Japan, said that “after about 10 minutes I’m like ‘I’m convinced, shut it off’…I mean I 
recognize it but you just have to put it aside.” Leslie, a seasonal state employee, small 
entrepreneur, and sailing enthusiast remarked: “well [the tsunami] is bound to happen, 
fault lines and whatnot. It’s just due. It’s due.” Yet when asked whether the anxiety that 
she described as having resulted from this danger influenced her decision to leave the 
area by means of a planned long-term sailing voyage, she responded with a simple “no, 
not really.”  
These examples illustrate the common perspective of people who recognize the 
extreme risk presented to the community on a long timescale yet remain ambivalent when 
they discuss this risk. Many have engaged with the idea of an earthquake and tsunami 
professionally, exhibited an awareness of the origin story of its discovery and description 
by geologists, or are frank in their assessments of its potentially catastrophic results. 
Despite this body of knowledge and belief, however, they do not evince an associated 
deep sense of despair or resignation.  
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 A second viewpoint links a belief in determinism with a countervailing argument 
that notwithstanding the recognition of the probable effects of the earthquake and 
tsunami, it is a risk worth taking. This is described by Matthew, a government employee 
who had lived in other parts of Oregon, moved to the area only a few years before, and 
has decided to make the area his long-term home. He spoke about his understanding of 
how the greater community understands the earthquake threat and the psychological 
effects of that knowledge:  
And when the 9.7 [earthquake] recalibrates everything around here it will 
be, you know, start from scratch….And I think that, too…is part of the 
psyche is that anybody who’s lived here for very long at all realizes that, 
you know, you deal with winter storms all the time, you get the full brunt 
70 mile per hour winds, oh my god. And then you’re also constantly being 
bombarded with tsunami warnings and tsunami escape routes and so a lot 
of people are pretty into that and they understand that an earthquake could 
do some serious hurt and so I think in the back of people’s minds they 
know that this could change just like that, in a big way. 
 
Yet this had no apparent effect on his desire to remain; he resolutely made clear that he 
had decided to retire in the area due in part to its natural beauty notwithstanding this 
knowledge. Jack, who grew up in the area and recently returned after some time spent 
working elsewhere expressed a similar sentiment: “I have a friend [in another coastal 
town],” he reported “[who is] concerned about the big earthquake when it happens and, 
you know, there’s always that risk…but I think the risk of that, the chance of that 
happening will always be outweighed by the benefit of living here, and you’ll always get 
people living here up until the earthquake happens.” 
Contrast this with the viewpoint of Melinda, who runs a small contracting firm 
that works on a number of sites throughout the county. Describing her work near a 
chromium mine in the hills on the outskirts of Coos Bay:  
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I’ve been on those sites [chromium mines]. And the whole idea that the 
chromium comes up the ocean and it gets stuck at the parts that stick out. 
And then when the tsunami comes it lifts it up and deposits it, and those 
sites are way up high and the whole idea [is] that the tsunami came and 
lifted it. That’s made me realize that oh, we’re all dead. There’s no safe 
spot. It’s all the way up in the hills there. We’re all dead….Knowledge, 
knowledge is great. And horribly scary. 
 
Melinda also relates an uncommon perspective on preparedness: its futility 
notwithstanding that she has endeavored to prepare herself and her family. While she 
does take precautions, these are based in developing independent skills that will allow her 
to survive the first few minutes. Still, she admits, “you know it’s a catastrophic event that 
you keep thinking you can prepare for and you can’t really prepare for it.” Gary, a local 
businessman and outdoor enthusiast with a strong appreciation of the area’s natural 
amenities, echoed these feelings: “there is a very real possibility that we could have a 
devastating earthquake here and we’re not prepared at all.” Melinda’s mixed feelings 
about environmental risk and preparedness evidence that compartmentalizing the 
meanings that people express about such risks might be overly simplistic. It is possible to 
have a strong sense of environmental determinism and still engage with one or more of 
the other discursive practices that tend to draw future memory away from a deterministic 
viewpoint. This does not mean that the practice eradicates any sense of determinism. The 
key is which discursive practices are emphasized, and to what extent. 
George, a retired scientist who reported feeling an overall sense of optimism 
about the town due to the presence of natural resources and the community’s relationship 
with them described a similar sense of resignation. He stated that he “doesn't care” about 
uncertainty related to the earthquake and tsunami because of his focus on relative 
certainty: “You know there’s going to be a big earthquake…Well, is that uncertain or 
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certain? It’s uncertain when, but it’s certain that it will. And…that’s gonna hit the reset 
button on all these towns….I mean it’s totally gonna, it’s gonna be major.” Later he 
continued by noting that he liked to worry about the natural world and that “[he] can be 
much more comfortable thinking that there will be a geologic future to this place. 
Whether it includes our species or not I don’t really know.”  After noting that he had 
given up his “house to the tsunami gods because we’re in the zone,” he remarked that 
“you just need to be aware that that’s what the natural world is, recognizing that there 
will be a devastating event…and the notion that there will be one of these large scale 
events in my lifetime is both frightening and compelling.” 
Bob, also a retired scientist, represents the extreme form of adherence of 
environmental determinism. Perhaps the best informed study participant about the risks 
of geophysical changes to the coast, he maintains his high level of knowledge through 
daily consumption of media and academic materials focused on coastal and climate 
science, and still find evident joy in his professional associations: he related his 
excitement about attending an upcoming professional conference and keeping up with 
former colleagues even after his retirement. He also feels a strong affinity to Coos Bay as 
a coastal area and appreciation for community-wide efforts promoting tsunami 
preparedness, yet decided to renovate and sell his house, then move east, because his new 
town would be outside of the earthquake and tsunami risk zone. When asked whether this 
was the primary reason for the planned move, he explained:  
It is, it is. I look for statistics that will allow me to make some kind of 
sense out of the almost random nature of these events and the one that 
sticks so closely is the one that says that the intervals between these major 
tsunamis in the last 7,000 years, 75% of them have been shorter than the 
interval we’re in now. That to me is a way to make sense of random 
events. Yeah, so I wouldn’t mind getting out of here before it gets me and 
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my wife is even worse….Has these damn nightmares about tsunamis 
sucking us up. 
 
 These participants illustrate the continuum upon which the environmental 
determinist standpoint exists, even among people who are highly cognizant of potentially 
catastrophic material reality of an earthquake and tsunami. Though the primary narrative 
strain that is concerned with the event—that of its future occurrence and destructive 
effects—is relatively consistent, there are a number of discrete perspectives that result 
from this common future memory. For example, although Bob and Melinda had similar 
thoughts about the material reality, their reaction was strikingly different. Part of this may 
be explained by the personal background of each: Bob as a scientist who came to the area 
relatively late in his life, whereas Melinda is a lifelong resident. While she has found 
success in her professional career, Melinda also strongly expressed a shared identity with 
other longtime residents of Coos Bay who look “beat up” and experience loneliness and 
isolation due to the rugged nature of the coast. She described how these residents must 
rely on physical and mental strength to get through the day.  
 Despite resignation to a material reality, then, issues of identity and socialization 
appear to still influence approaches to catastrophic risk. Yet despite the interior 
complexity of those holding deterministic viewpoints, this is merely a starting place for 
the exploration of other modes of narrative complexity that influence how this 
community understands future risk. Bearing this in mind, we now turn to some more 
concrete ways that people socially construct disaster narratives in a manner that draws 
them away from environmentally deterministic perspectives, using constructed memories 
of the past to create memories of the future.  
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 b. Symbolic Isolation and Self-Reliance.  
 “The difficult times of the present” in Coos Bay, writes historian William G. 
Robbins (2006, p. 10), “mirrored a historical tradition that involved struggle, sacrifice, 
and a willingness to ‘stick it out.’” On the “isolated southern Oregon coast,” early 
historical connections were primarily south to California due to the lack of overland 
routes linking the area to the rest of Oregon (Robbins, 2006, pp.10, 15-25). One late 
nineteenth century resident put it plainly: “We don’t know anything of Oregon except 
that our votes are returned and counted in Salem” (Robbins, 2006, p. 17). This legacy of 
isolation on the coast remains palpable today and was a common theme described by 
study participants both in the context of relationships between insiders and outsiders and 
in the context of the discursive differences between those with a longer personal history 
in the area and relative newcomers.   
 “When I look at the entire Oregon coast,” related one participant “we’re 
distinguished by some of our assets….And also our isolation. Actually, isolation is a 
good theme for the coast.” One long-time resident expressed the feeling of economic 
isolation of the Coos Bay area specifically through geography: “we seem to be unable to 
mount an effective economic development area because we are literally at the end of the 
road.” Being at the end of the road had other material consequences, as noted by Charles, 
a retired educator who remained active in the community through his work with a number 
of community development and service organizations: “[supermarket] shelves get empty 
in three days if highway 48 and 32 get closed off.” Others tended to agree that a 
psychological barrier brings about feelings of remoteness that interfered with economic 
potential. Matthew, the government worker who had moved to the area only a couple of 
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years before and had since resolved to remain, described this psychological remoteness as 
an “out of sight, out of mind thing” that has contributed to the prevention of the town 
from developing a tourism industry in line with other coastal towns that enjoy a 
perception—one not necessarily reflective of geography—of closer infrastructural 
connections with the inland regions.   
 Isolation was sometimes expressed as a product of history that incorporates both 
local geography and feelings of community in reference to the history of the area. Ron, a 
lifelong resident of retirement age, descendant of a family of historically notable locals, 
and a living repository of local history and lore, described how contemporary geography 
tends to isolate the area due to lack of direct connections to the interstate highway 
system. He also described how, until bridges were constructed in the 1930s, the only way 
to travel the coast overland involved ferrying across the numerous short rivers that run 
out of the mountain range that flanks the coast. These lengthy journeys often required a 
series of overnight stays waiting for ferries: “there’s all this culture, pre-bridge ferryboat 
villages.”  
 Remarking on her experience when she first arrived in the area for work, as a 
product of both local weather and isolation from family and friends, Valerie recalls that:  
There’s a book…and it talks about some of the European settlers that 
came and there’s a family that came from Finland…and they’re now one 
of the homestead families…but there’s a part of the book where the wife 
did the same thing I did. She’s sitting on a tree stump in the pouring rain 
like ‘why did we have to come here,’ and I can relate to that.  
 
Notwithstanding this inauspicious start, Valerie related how after originally moving to 
Coos Bay for employment, she came to appreciate the social and natural amenities of the 
area and is now highly satisfied with the decision to move there.   
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 This sense of isolation also was expressed in direct response to questions about 
potential disaster. Valerie’s thoughts represented the way that the area might be isolated 
in the event of a CSZ event because of its reliance on bridges for overland travel: “those 
are big deal things if [the earthquake and tsunami] happen, those will change the area and 
we’re landlocked, I mean, if that happens our bridges are out, we’re stuck. So we really 
need to think about that, prepare for it.” Bob, the retired scientist introduced previously, 
who described the building of roads and bridges to connect the towns of Coos Bay to 
neighboring areas as one of the area’s most important historical developments, said:   
It would be good if we could get help from the state and people here feel 
quite isolated from the [Willamette Valley] and especially from Portland. I 
hear that a lot: that Portland politicians have no idea what goes on here, 
what the needs are down here and so on, and have no interest in doing 
anything about what needs to be done here. But in the final analysis I think 
it’s the people here that need to [respond to disaster risk]. 
 
 This is reflective of an additional theme. When asked who is responsible for 
addressing future coastal change, participants were nearly uniform in giving some 
variation of “all of us.” Although it was phrased different ways and some participants 
also referenced various governmental bodies or gave caveats, on a foundational level the 
response indicated a desire for community-wide involvement that essentially devolved a 
significant portion of responsibility for response to individuals, and to the community as 
a whole. Part of this was possibly a functional response to expectations of rescue from the 
outside that were linked to this overall feeling of isolation. As Charles, the retired 
educator, describes:  
Well, I think the uncertainty is the possibility of the, the big quake and 
that’s, that’s a little concerning because…we’re so remote and by the time 
that we get onto the radar because of our population, that’s…a 
concern….When people come to high ground [to avoid the tsunami], what 
do we do? You know, for a period of time [until help arrives]? 
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 Laurie, who is professionally involved in disaster management and quickly noted 
the potentially “devastating” effects of the CSZ event in a manner that seemed rather 
deterministic, said that her “work allows me to realize that there’s gonna be help coming 
in…but it’s gonna be focused on the high population areas, and we’re not one of those.” 
This is reflective of a sense of contemporary isolation in terms of services needed to 
respond to other human crises. In the words of Celia, a non-profit manager who has lived 
in the area for her entire adult life: “we’re kind of isolated because we’re off the I-5 
corridor so that we don’t get a lot of things that cities….We don’t have as much as other 
communities along the corridor because they get funding first and then it trickles down.”. 
The joining of historical and contemporary feelings of isolation, however, does 
not necessarily imply an overarching feeling of helplessness. Historical isolation has 
bred, among a smaller subset of participants, a countervailing narrative of self-reliance. 
This is expressed both in the feelings of individual responsibility for maintenance of their 
own well-being and through the projection of survival strategies into the future based on 
historical experiences with isolation that have developed local character and tradition of 
this area. “People flock to the edge of the map,” Jack said, “and this is one of the edges of 
the map….Historically the west and Oregon have been a place that have attracted 
pioneers so I think there’s a contingency of people that are here in this environment for 
that reason.” His grandfather—who had been a bus driver before he decamped for Coos 
Bay in the 1940s seeking adventure as a fisher—had been one of those pioneers. Max, a 
fisher known in the community for his civic-mindedness and thoughtfulness, explained 
that “we’re only about 150 years old out here versus the east coast which is about 350 
years old…and it seems like on the west coast we haven’t had engrained that culture so 
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deep for so long and we’re a bit freer to think in different directions…so, it’s like the wild 
west in a way.” 
 This is reflective of the nearly unanimous opinion—notwithstanding that many 
participants described internal discord in the community along political and social lines 
about other issues—that local people and communities must take primary responsibility 
for addressing the complexities of future change. Even if it was not explicitly stated, a 
sense of this feeling sometimes arose in subtle references to economic or social optimism 
notwithstanding past economic shocks in narratives that link the town’s modern 
experience to its resource extractive past. That is to say that, although the opinion that 
local people were responsible for their own future well-being was in some cases related 
to isolation, more generally it was based in a sincere belief in self-sufficiency. Living off 
the land is, in Coos Bay, a central narrative of life that is implicitly expressed in a 
multiplicity of contexts. These range from its historical experiences with resource 
extraction, to current debates regarding the wisdom of development strategies that 
emphasize industry or tourism, to the negotiation of community self-identity.  
 Yet in some cases it was stated explicitly in the context of natural hazards. Anna, 
a businesswoman from a prominent family who was one of the least concerned about 
future uncertainty in general, summarizing her viewpoint as “all Skittles and rainbows,” 
described the legacy of what she termed her “pioneer “ancestry: 
So, being a fifth generation Oregonian, it’s knowing how to be sustainable 
and not have to rely if…the world comes to an end. I hate to [be] 
catastrophic but you need to be able to be self-sufficient and rely on what 
you know how to do. What you can catch, what you can hunt…So I 
think…that was ingrained in me, I was raised with that philosophy 
of…grow your own food.  
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The cultural and social endowments of the community, based in its resource 
extractive past, were also expressly described by some participants. Alison, a small 
business owner and local activist who first moved to the community 15 years previously, 
describes these endowments as part of her feeling of optimism for the future of the 
community: 
Just a generation and a half ago this or, 2 generations ago, we were [the]… 
biggest sawmill export town in the world….And things have shut down 
over that time. But the skill sets that are required to cut down logs, live 
kind of hand to mouth, when the logging’s good, it’s good, when the 
fishing’s good, it’s good, when it’s not, it’s not. So we have a populace 
here that knows how to catch its own food, grow its own food, 
communicate with each other, share their resources, and those are very 
difficult jobs to have, so I think we have a very strong skill set.  
 
Furthermore, in a later discussion about the CSZ earthquake risk, she describes her 
personal interest in helping to provide clean water and power in order to “lessen the 
stresses that make monsters out of people.”  
 The salience of the area’s resource extractive past cannot be overstated. In 
response to a question about the most important historical event or events in the history 
of the area, there was near unanimity in reference to some analog of its history as a 
timber town. This was true for participants with familial roots in the area’s distant past 
and relative newcomers. When participants expressed optimism about the future it was 
often, although not always, linked to their belief that the decline of timber and fishing 
could or would be overcome. When they expressed pessimism it was often, although 
again not always, linked in some way to the residual economic challenges presented by 
the decline of these industries. It was possible to observe, therefore, how through 
reference to the narratives of the past a responsive narrative or vision for the future has 
developed among a subset of the population. This narrative both recognizes the more 
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common theme of isolation and envisions past experience with that isolation as providing 
the necessary skills for survival.  
 This sense of isolation manifested in a number of additional ways that participants 
defined themselves and their communities. First, participants described outsiders as 
having more negative views of the area and newcomers as being more open to change 
than “old timers.” One participant who felt exceptionally strong ties to and appreciation 
for the local community and its small town character incredulously recalled that a 
Portlander she knew refused to visit, in his ugly words, “bum fuck Coos Bay.” Insiders 
also reported being generally more optimistic about their lives within the context of the 
area’s future than outsiders. Melinda, the lifelong resident profiled previously, and others 
described how newcomers are given a two-year social waiting period; those who make it 
past that point tend to stay due to an appreciation of the area’s positive attributes that 
subsumes the perceived negatives. Furthermore, newcomers were sometimes described as 
more willing to embrace change. Yet this dichotomy between insiders and outsiders does 
not imply that one group to the exclusion of the other expressed either isolation or self-
reliance narratives: the individuals previously profiled in this section include lifelong 
residents and a number of people who moved to the area from elsewhere.  
 Second, the sense of isolation was based firmly in the local identity as a small 
town, and this small town feeling was described, in part, as the result of isolation. 
Numerous participants described some variant of a tradeoff occasioned by living in a 
small town. On the one hand, they found natural beauty, the lack of crowds, and the 
perceived safety of the small town environment as having attracted them to the area, 
motivated them to stay, or helped them to overcome the initial shock experienced upon 
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arrival. The appreciation for this “moderate” pace of life was palpable. On the other, the 
small town environment was thought to interfere with ease of access to amenities and 
services, as well as the development of economic opportunity to fill the void left by the 
decline in resource extractive industries.  
 The continuing sense of the social effects of this economic isolation manifests in 
other ways: beyond general unease with the present economy there was a concern that the 
lack of employment in the area was resulting in demographic changes because young 
people were being forced to leave to find jobs. The dislocation of young families based 
on economic necessity was a common theme. Yet isolation was also deeply related to the 
reasons that residents moved to the area or intended to stay; in particular it is interesting 
that small town character occasioned by isolation was described as creating a sense of 
safety. Thus isolation as a source of community safety countermands the observation that 
links isolation and danger in the natural hazards context.  
 Similarly, the importance of the natural beauty and amenities provided by this 
section of the coast and the consequent attraction for those who appreciate certain 
qualities of the outdoors cannot be overstated. Narratives that deeply touched central 
aspects of family and community reflect isolation in both a positive and negative sense. 
Isolation and self-reliance, therefore, did not arise out of the ether: each is deeply rooted 
in the local character and tradition of place, and intimately informs relative levels of 
satisfaction with the area. These cultural narratives, put simply, are emplaced in the basic 
character of the area.  
 Isolation itself and its salience in the community, therefore, seems generative of 
two related narratives that help develop collective memories of the future, both of which 
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are based in past experience. The first narrative is one of isolation in which human help 
will not be soon to arrive after a catastrophe. Although this is hardly generative of hope 
or optimism it does serve to reframe the CSZ event in localized human terms, altering the 
vision of future events. Another, shared by a subset of adherents of the first perspective, 
directs that the community will have to depend on its historically proven self-reliance to 
get by.  
 In a manner similar to the processes identified by Motloch et al. (2000) in creating 
local place character and traditions a few hundred miles down the coast, isolation and 
self-reliance reflect community character in the Coos Bay context, as mediated over time 
to create tradition. The perspective that arises out of this tradition and projects into the 
future tends to mitigate the unsettling effects of catastrophic environmental risk, 
particularly as it may be incident to the deep sense of isolation that is felt in the 
community. In each case this perspective has manifested in the context of the CSZ event 
first in a recognition of isolation based in local economic and social narratives of place 
and second in a default to culturally derived narratives that have served to create a sense 
of the future and what it will entail.  
c.  Symbolic Preparedness.  
 Although the narratives of isolation and self-reliance rest, generally, on 
preparedness skills developed in a turbulent past and relevant to withstanding adverse 
environmental change, a second category—symbolic preparedness—involves forms of 
preparedness that are more related to current institutional and personal efforts to ensure 
preparedness. Symbolic preparedness represents the dominant counter-narrative to an 
environmentally deterministic approach to the CSZ event because it occurred with the 
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greatest frequency among participants. In comparison, while narratives of self-reliance 
based in local history and tradition were common among participants they did not arise in 
a majority of cases even though the complementary, predicate narrative of place-based 
isolation did. 
 Like symbolic isolation and self-reliance, symbolic preparedness has been 
developed against a backdrop of recognition of the risk of catastrophic environmental 
change, and these responses focused primarily on the threat of earthquake and tsunami. 
These connect with organized efforts in the community to encourage preparedness—both 
in terms of tsunami drills in which a significant portion of the population walked to high 
grounds and professional efforts in relevant fields—and individualized efforts such as 
packing survival kits, stockpiling supplies, building capacity for home-based power and 
water generation, and devising individual evacuation and sheltering plans.  
 As described previously, this category is not conceptually distinct from the others: 
often narratives emphasizing preparedness were linked to environmental determinism, a 
sense of isolation, or both. The intent behind creating this categorical distinction is 
instead to emphasize the ways in which these narratives, like the symbols of isolation and 
self-reliance, modify the ways that people conceptualize their environmental future away 
from an environmentally deterministic viewpoint, albeit at times incompletely so.  
 Audrey, a medical professional who seemed tireless in her vocational and 
personal endeavors, had an intimate knowledge of community preparedness efforts. She 
recounted both choosing a house outside of the tsunami zone, the effects of a family 
member’s military training on her personal preparedness, and working with her patients 
and others in the medical field to encourage individual preparedness and the development 
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of medical capacity. Yet she described these as efforts to be as “semi-be as prepared as 
possible.” As with a number of responses in this line, preparation is also linked to local 
isolation and a description of future events: 
I think the one change you’re going to see as [a] clinician…is the 9.2 
earthquake that we are pending, and tsunami. We run drills every month, 
we do radio checks on a monthly basis, so if it’s in three years, 30 years, 
six months, 600 years, we are prepared. We have multiple trainings; we 
are very, very, very active in preparing. But [we are] also training other 
people so if this happens after we’re long gone they’ll continue that trend. 
The tough thing about Coos Bay is that we are extremely isolated...our 
airstrip will be under water and the only two air accessible strips where 
you can get an airplane will be surrounded by water. They won’t be able 
to access but just small areas so we’ve worked on creating small pods in 
individual areas where a bunch of the surgeons are. 
 
Amy, the tourism professional introduced earlier, linked acts symbolizing 
preparedness to a greater sense of security in the area, while at the same time describing a 
personal example of lack of preparation: 
I’m not driving around with my survival kit, I know friends who are. It’s 
just difficult to comprehend…for people that really panic about it, the idea 
that I was told is that “if you put that [emergency] kit together you feel 
you’ve got that much more control to kind of fight back your demons or 
whatever.” I just have to…look the other way and hope that it doesn’t 
happen to me, or that I’m at home when it does. 
 
Tim, who runs a transportation business and is active in community affairs, 
seconds the general concern about the risk of earthquake and tsunami, and the power of 
symbols of preparedness to alleviate conversational concern. In response to a question 
asking whether he was concerned about coastal flooding generally, he responded: 
No, and one of the things I’ve thought about and I guess this might be 
a…physical environment concern, is that they keep talking…about what 
we’re going to do for this subduction quake….I keep talking to my wife, 
at least once of month it’s a topic of conversation, hey we have to put 
a survival kit together,…so we’ve been saying that for like four years, and 
one of these days I will do it, probably hopefully before the quake… But, 
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it’s not a concern. You know, it’s not something I lay awake about or 
anything. 
 
Charles, who expressed fear of being left alone until help arrives, described 
having a backyard garden partially in response to the chance of earthquake risk, as well 
as the development of response teams to address local issues. As mentioned earlier, 
Alison felt that preparedness should involve ensuring alternative sources of energy and 
water in the event that infrastructure was destroyed. Bob, who evidenced in his planned 
move away from the area the strongest personal reaction to the threat, viewed the 
widespread community tsunami drills, one of which he estimated had 10,000 participants, 
as evidence that people are “taking the threat seriously.” The preparedness practices that 
other participants reported ranging from keeping a sailboat in their backyard as a 
makeshift tsunami refuge, to developing personal water and power backup systems, to 
strict adherence to earthquake codes, to education in schools and within the wider 
community.   
This is not to imply that everyone shares a sense of security in the sufficiency of 
local preparedness. As Gary, the local business owner and outdoor enthusiast whose lack 
of faith in the level of preparedness was described above, recounted: 
I remember, I think it was a sheriff who did an interview, and he said…the 
last time they had a tsunami warning, everyone drove to the beach. It was 
like… they wanted to see what it looked like, yeah stupid stupid stupid. 
He said next time instead of putting up a tsunami warning we're gonna say 
there's a bar fight in Coos Bay downtown, get ‘em off of the beach.  
 
The foregoing accounts should not, however, be taken to minimize the 
preparation process nor the efforts of those who participate. It is not intended to critique 
the urge to prepare nor the potential efficacy of preparedness projects. Yet in this 
community the image of assembling an emergency kit might obscure the heart wrenching 
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reality that surrounds preparedness. These hard and regular realities that are faced in the 
process of preparedness planning were poignantly emphasized by Celia, the non-profit 
manager who is also a mother of five: 
I know that people have been, and school have been looking at safety 
preparedness, and so that's been a huge change. Because when I was 
growing up here none of this stuff was talked about. And now we're 
supplying like, little snack packs, we write letters to our kids, and put 
pictures of the family in these little Zip-Loc bags and they store them with 
a bottle of water so in case a tsunami knocks, because we’re connected by 
bridges here and that's the first thing that's gonna go, is the bridges, which 
I think is really sad, like if you never see your mommy and daddy again 
here's a letter of how much we love you and a picture. Yeah, it's a little 
creepy. 
 
In many of these accounts there is a sort of dissonance that manifests either 
through the admission of highly active semi-preparedness or through expressions of 
conscious concern coupled with a lack of action due to being overwhelmed or not caring 
too deeply. What is significant in these expressions of preparedness for the purpose of 
this analysis is not whether these efforts to be prepared are sufficient in light of the 
impending threat, but their symbolic value. This symbolic value tended to mitigate the 
discursive potency of the threat of the CSZ earthquake, reframing the conversation from 
what the effects will be—the material reality—to what people are doing.  
In many cases sufficiency seemed to be symbolically implied, whereas in others it 
was symbolically or directly questioned or denied. It is important to recognize that 
official entreaties to prepare are ubiquitous in the area. Beyond the described evacuation 
drills, school programs, and reminders to assemble an emergency kit, the coast is littered 
with blue and white signs specifying the location of the nearest tsunami evacuation route. 
Even for a newcomer such as myself the geologic future of the area was palpable. Within 
days of first arriving in the area—and before I knew that the earthquake and tsunami 
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threat would be a focus of this study—I found that even without any active consideration 
I was aware of the importance of the steep hill that rose up directly behind the close-to-
sea-level building in which I was staying. Subtly the question was reframed from “what 
will happen?” to “what will I do when it happens?”  
In essence, stories about preparedness in this group of participants tended to 
dominate the memory of the future as it related to the CSZ event, inserting personal and 
community agency into accounts of an expected event over which people have no 
geophysical agency. This was the case regardless of whether the specific opinion 
expressed was optimistic or pessimistic, hopeful or resigned, or whether it expressed a 
belief in the adequacy or inadequacy of response. This is not to imply that efforts 
focusing on preparedness should be discontinued or called into question as a general 
matter. Indeed, the opposite is likely true. Instead, it acknowledges that the narrative 
effect of preparedness by multiple means can result in unanticipated effects on the basic 
discursive potency of knowledge within a community. As will be discussed, this 
discursive potency may influence social unsettlement, which in turn may influence 
action.   
 d. Analogy to the Familiar. 
 In the climate change context, respondents tended to use a process that I term 
analogy to the familiar to converse about the potential effects of climate change. This 
manifested primarily in two distinct ways: analogy to recurrent coastal flooding; and 
analogy to existing frames of reference used to understand economic concerns. Each of 
these created an effect similar to what Norgaard (2009, quoting in part Cohen (2001)), 
describes in the context of climate change as a form of implicatory denial: “what is 
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minimized is not information, but ‘the psychological, political or moral implications that 
conventionally follow’….[It is] not…a rejection of information per se, but the failure to 
integrate this knowledge into everyday life or transform it into social action.” In this way 
denial of climate change does not have to be literal: a person can accept that climate 
change is real yet deny it by implication based on their actions.  
Only a very small minority of survey participants called into question the 
existence of climate change or that it may have potential effects on coastal areas; these 
few instances were generally in the form of admitting ignorance of the issue. There were 
a few secondhand accounts of climate denial: one participant related her husband’s 
resistance to the idea due to his conservative political stance; another described 
encountering denialists at local meetings; and a third described the community’s climate 
change views as something of a microcosm of the “national debate, there’s deniers, 
there’s I don’t give a shits, there’s the we gotta do somethings, save the whales, no eat the 
whales, that kind of thing.” While there may have been others who harbored doubts about 
climate change, these doubts were not expressed within the interview process.  
While this study was originally concerned with the flooding effects of climate 
change, only the second means of relating to climate change directly implicated flooding. 
The first way—which is termed the Napa North analogy—came as quite a surprise. It 
involved the tendency of study participants to view climate change in a positive light due 
to the expectation that it will bring warmer weather and replace summer fog with 
sunshine. The term Napa North was borrowed from Audrey, who stated that the “Napa 
Valley [is a] wonderful place to grow wine [and] has been for years. Well now you look 
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at the [nearby] Rogue Valley. It is much hotter than it used to be; it’s affectionately 
known as Napa North.”  
Similarly, Matthew explained, only half jokingly, that climate change might turn 
the area into the new San Diego, quite a contrast to the normally wet and chilly Oregon 
coast. Gerry, who cited the stark beauty and proximity to the beach as what brought him 
to the community and kept him there, was a little more moderate in his treatment of 
California weather, remarking that “more people will move here because it’s going to be 
so unbearably hot south that they’re going to start moving north and realizing that…these 
are the original San Francisco Bay Area conditions that we moved to.” After noting a 
concern with sea level rise, Max echoed this thought process, with reservations: “as our 
climate changes…the Oregon grapes are a good year because it’s a drier year, better 
grapes and all that stuff, that’s good for some people but other people need more water, 
you know farmers….” 
This might have been a temporary result of the conditions at the time interviews 
took place; over the course of parts of six weeks in the area from June to August I only 
saw significant fog twice. Everyone agreed that fog should be an ever-present feature of 
the summer in Coos Bay and that that summer was highly abnormal. However, given the 
economic priorities that suffused every interview and close to every topic about the area, 
it is more likely that these are reasoned opinions that translate current understanding of 
one aspect of the anticipated local effects of climate change—hotter, drier, summers—
into an economic wellspring. Charles, who is involved with efforts to create cultural 
experiences in Coos Bay for the purpose of developing both tourism and overall quality 
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of life, reflected that because of climate change  “I think that more people are going to 
move here.”  
Melinda also saw a positive in the effects of global warming: “my opinion of this 
area has changed in the past four or five years….I didn’t hate it, but it was not where I 
wanted to live, and in the last four or five years be it global warming or whatever the 
weather has improved and my attitude has improved.” Later she related her views on 
community discourse about global warming, as well as its expected effects on rainfall in 
Oregon as opposed to elsewhere, with a laugh: 
Because the weather is improving it makes me excited. I know the ocean’s 
supposed to rise…and it’s going to be horrible and everything like that 
but because we’re on the coast we keep thinking that we’re in this little 
safe bubble and so I’ve kind of carried that “it’s going to be great” because 
everyone wants to move here because we have water.  
 
The Napa North example found another expression in a past case of potentially 
adverse environmental issue that brought economic advantage. In the words of Richard:  
You know if the economy is stronger, you, you have more people 
spending money, the businesses doing well, and…we had back in ‘98 a 
chip ship [a bulk freight carrier that exports wood chips from the Port of 
Coos Bay] go on the beach…called the New Carissa….So for three or four 
months the help arrived in droves, the hotels were full the restaurants were 
busy, the stores because…they wanted to get the boat off the beach. There 
are some people that would say “gosh we lost another tourist attraction 
[when the ship was removed],” but other people that would go “oh but it’s 
polluting.” I’m not sure that that the truth isn’t somewhere in the middle. 
And…there was a micro-boom in the economy. 
 
Jack made a similar connection between potential environmental degradation and benefit 
using the frame of the New Carissa incident. He labeled it a “defining incident” in the 
area that emphasized the “trade-offs between the use of natural resources in our 
environment around us…and some of the risks involved with those.”  
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It seems that the Napa North analogy, however, was lodged firmly in the summer. 
This analogy focused on the last few years of moderate weather and experiences—or at 
least perceptions—of the positive effects of weather elsewhere on local moods and 
economies. Flooding is generally a winter occurrence in this area, and the study 
participants treated winter flooding as ordinary and familiar. Despite the potential for 
winter flooding to increase in severity and magnitude due to climate change, these winter 
floods were analogized to recurrent known flooding in a manner that affected the 
narratives that they tell about the flooding expected from climate change. When asked 
about climate change related flooding Richard responded, “well, you have to understand 
that we're sitting on fill now, ok…the natural shore is 10 blocks that way” as he pointed 
inland from the café where we were meeting (which was itself two blocks from the 
present shoreline). He continued, “I think that cities like New York and, are going to be 
at more risk. Do I think that, in the foreseeable future is it  [sea level] going to rise 
enough to flood Coos Bay? Well hell, Coos Bay floods now if you give it a chance.” 
Having been professionally involved in a number of real estate transactions prior to 
retirement, he stated “the joke is here ‘don't buy any piece of land unless you look at it in 
February and March to see exactly how much water there is.’ And…do I lie awake at 
night worrying about it? No.” 
He was not alone in this assessment, not by a long shot. Amy related a story 
prefaced by “I know about flooding” that discussed the redesign of a car dealership and 
another local business to raise their foundations and avoid flooding, along with other 
local landscape design elements meant to avoid regular flood damage. Bob, who has been 
both professionally and personally involved in learning about the effects of climate 
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change, related the way that dunes near his house have eroded due to coastal storms, thus 
leading to increased risk of regular flooding for some of his neighbors. Tim echoed the 
general sentiment: “If [flooding] happens it happens and you pick it up and leave it, I 
mean that's just the way it is.” Anna adopted a similarly dismissive tone: she stated that 
she didn’t think flooding would affect the area and agreed that it is a normal winter 
occurrence.  
Alison, who sometimes works in building engineering, when asked about whether 
she thinks of flooding, pointed to a building she took part in designing and said “Oh yeah, 
I live in a floodplain….The whole construction and build out of this building was defined 
by the floodplain and the regulations that surround that, so I think about it regularly.” 
When asked about whether she felt that toxins might infiltrate the estuary due to 
increased climate change-related flooding, she responded “more so I think about the 
storm water, I mean, the hey it doesn’t have to be a flood event around here. We just have 
a very high water table.” Matthew spoke to the experiences of other people who live in 
areas accessible only by roads that are subject to regular flooding:  
When you try to drive from point A to point B around here, oop, you can't 
go over this bridge because it's underwater. You know, so that's a natural, 
a natural and reoccurring phenomenon around here….I think the approach 
is everybody…this weekend actually I just stocked up on, you know, an 
emergency pack, and people have those, especially…up the Millicoma 
[River], places where they gotta go over bridges or low spots, they know 
that they're going to be socked in for a couple or three or four days, or 
maybe a week.  
 
Together these analogies—the analogy to familiar coastal flooding and to a lesser 
extent Napa North—dominated the discourse about climate change. Unlike in the case of 
the CSZ earthquake and tsunami, memories of future climate change have concrete roots 
in lived and perceived experience. Recent changes in weather patterns and comparisons 
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to the relatively economically healthy tourist and retiree destinations, not to mention 
agricultural areas, to the south influenced Napa North. This was linked to salience in the 
area of economic benefit by whatever means (in this case tourism), as well as the social 
change that may be promised by an influx of retirees or other affluent migrants. The 
ubiquity of regular winter flooding, and each person’s intimate experience with it, 
informs their approach, in this case evidently attenuating their sense of risk by 
characterizing it by reference to known quantities or modes of thought. In this way, in 
this context the risk of climate change related flooding is conceptually very different 
from that of CSZ earthquake risk, both because there are personal and community-wide 
precedents to work from.  
Four narrative themes that outline how members of this community describe and 
understand environmental risk have been presented in this section. The significance of 
these observations, however, does not revolve solely around the narratives themselves.  
Instead, it also involves the ways that these narratives link to ideas about how changes in 
ideology and action come to pass after knowledge of novel and potentially unsettling 
conditions or circumstances percolates through a community. These narratives dovetail 
with the theoretical approach to revision of strategies of action based in the use of 
cultural tools developed by Lizardo and Strand (2010). Importantly, these do not only 
address the use of cultural tools to develop new strategies of action in response to 
unsettlement, but consider environmental risk as generative of the unsettlement necessary 
to break free of the constraints of the commonsensical or normal and to explore 
alternatives.  
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In Section VI the idea of future memory and its bases in mnemonics and shared 
narratives will be revisited. In turn, the correspondence between these narratives and the 
various stages of theoretical unsettlement described by Lizardo and Strand (2010) will be 
illustrated. For example, analogy to the familiar corresponds to a state of very limited or 
non-existent unsettlement that links to commonsensical approaches based in current 
experience, whereas symbolic preparedness, symbols of isolation and self-reliance, and 
environmental determinism correspond with increasing unsettlement and different trends 
in the deployment of cultural tools that might influence unsettlement. In this way the 
foregoing observations about future memory will be conceptually synthesized with their 




 This small sampling of members of the community of Coos Bay, Oregon, outlined 
a number of perspectives on environmental risks that people use to create and reinforce 
the way that they remember events that have not yet occurred. How people socially 
construct their narratives of the future as part of communities—whether defined by 
geography, interest, or otherwise—influences the way that they discursively interact with 
their memory of future environmental change and in turn how they sense environmental 
risk. Environmental change, however, was far from the most immediately salient concern 
that participants held in relation to the future of the area. Instead, they focused on more 
immediate concerns regarding the local economy, the potential for industrialization, and 
demographic shifts. When the line of questioning was focused on environmental matters, 
 89 
however, they began to emphasize the CSZ earthquake and tsunami, and in most cases 
climate change only arose as a topic of discussion through direct inquiry.  
 a. Socially Produced Future Memory and the Understanding of Risk.  
In these interviews, it was apparent that conversations about the risk of potentially 
adverse future environmental change were socially produced and existed as social 
mnemonics, if for no reason other than the observation that similar stories emerged across 
this sample of the community. Patterns in the sociomental understanding of future 
environmental risk emerged that tended, in different ways, to use mnemonic structures to 
ignore or emphasize a particular vision of the social and personal negatives that might 
result from future environmental risk. Given that both what we choose to ignore and what 
we choose to emphasize are powerful (Zerubavel, 1996, 2007) the mental visuals—the 
socially produced memory of the future—that translate into these narratives allow us to 
trace some means by which people come to understand future environmental risk.  
The narratives associated with symbolic isolation and self-reliance, symbolic 
preparedness, and the use of analogies to the familiar each drew the emphasis away from 
a vision of the material reality of events that is probable, or at least believed to be 
probable. Within the interviews, these narratives represented more than just something 
people said or a half-perspective that they believed to be true, but instead they 
represented a powerful vision of the future. This vision seemed to be not so much the 
product of unsettlement (or at least not only the product of unsettlement) but generative 
of feelings of settlement or unsettlement in the first place.     
It would be disingenuous to argue, however, that these narratives operated as 
some sort of cure or panacea for the fears or anxiety that is attendant to future risk. 
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Instead, they are more properly analogized to a salve. Zerubavel (2007) suggested that 
metanarratives that ignore or contradict an observable reality also have the capacity to 
unsettle. Along with the incomplete nature of the salve, this helps to harmonize the 
observation that people who related narratives of the CSZ earthquake and tsunami at 
times also related a sense of anxiety that suffused their descriptions. As Zerubavel may 
have predicted, the processes attendant to the creation of collective memories and the 
processes by which information was selectively emphasized or deemphasized appeared to 
be the product of collective orchestration. Yet this orchestration was bounded by 
historical and contemporary narratives of a resource extractive past, the boom and bust 
cycles of this past and current perspectives on industrialization, a present in which 
tourism and in-migration are generative of hope in economic recovery based in the 
natural aspects of place, an appreciation for aesthetic attributes of the community, and the 
social aspects derived from its isolated small town nature, and others.  
Memories of the future, therefore, should be viewed both as the product of place 
and community identities grounded in narratives of collective history, and generative of a 
lucid vision of the future that may tend to further bind the identity of the community. 
Moving backwards through the discursive practices previously described, analogy to the 
familiar tends to implicate recent personal experience and concerns, symbolic 
preparedness tends reflect explicitly stated community-wide imperatives, and symbolic 
isolation and self-reliance tends to emphasize deeper narratives of local place-based and 
community identity. Critically, each of these narratives evidenced the projection of 
present and historical thought processes into the future. It is intriguing to consider that to 
the dyad of historically-determined place tradition that bridges that past and the present, 
 91 
and place character that exists in the present, each as described by Motloch et al. (2000), 
a third phase of place identity may be added: that of place-based future memory and 
expectation that is traceable through the stories people tell about the future.  
While these stories incorporate a variety of representations of the material reality 
of the area, they present a lens through which it is possible to understand how future 
disaster is remembered without over-reliance on a single event-based vision of material 
reality. Furthermore, this expands the scope of social construction within the natural 
hazards context further afield from the command post, embracing a bottom up approach 
while at the same time not divorcing the community from its institutional and social 
history. Perhaps most importantly, it emphasizes a social approach to natural disaster that 
is not merely reactive: a vast majority of the analysis of natural disaster outside of the 
climate change context is focused on the post-disaster phase and not the precedents to 
disaster viewed from the ex ante standpoint.   
b. Socially Produced Narratives and the Production of Unsettlement.   
Having established the existence of these intersubjective environmental narratives 
that are present if not overwhelmingly salient, it is possible to explore the interaction 
between these narratives, their generation of social unsettlement, and eventually 
(although not in this study) the potential for the generative effects of this pattern to 
influence behavior. Originally, the aim of this study was to explore how familiar and 
unfamiliar environmental risk might (relatively linearly) amplify or attenuate the sense of 
unsettlement that Ann Swidler (1986) described as prompting revisions to strategies of 
action for life. Yet the emergence of the narrative structure of future memory over the 
course of participant interviews began to suggest that relative levels of unsettlement may 
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be intricately and possibly non-linearly linked to the ways that community members 
remember—meaning, how they concretely visualize—the story of their future in light of 
catastrophic environmental change.  
The first stage in understanding this structure involves ontological security. 
Challenges to ontological security and the sense of stability in the world that it describes 
provide a vehicle of unsettlement. Clearly, emergent knowledge of future catastrophic 
risk has the capacity to unsettle this sense of stability. Knowledge of the probable 
material reality of risks, however, did not seem to be determining factor in how this 
community socially produced their vision of the future (or their preferred response). 
Instead, each of the four narratives evidenced different strains that tended to maintain or 
challenge a sense of stability. As a preliminary matter, the environmentally deterministic 
view and its immanent disruption of the stable and meaningful world bears the most 
striking signs of unsettlement. Yet accounts of isolation and the resultant self-reliance 
also strongly evidenced unsettlement, albeit in a form that was discursively modified by 
history and tradition to lend a patina of future stability. Preparedness, too, was linked to 
unsettling visions but in most cases this story tended to produce greater settlement than 
the preceding two categories, in large part because the narrative focus was less on the 
destructive effects of expected events and more on a relatively empowering vision of 
present personal agency. Finally, the way that participants used analogies to the familiar 
in the context of climate change were clearly the least unsettling narrative focus, 
emphasizing only slight and distant concerns and countermanding these concerns, in 
some cases, with a sense of optimism.  
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Emerging from the recognition of the non-deterministic nature of knowledge (or 
understanding), this analysis allowed for a method of development of our understanding 
of how to conceptualize the basis for unsettlement embedded in each of these narratives 
of catastrophe.  When these four themes are compared to the states of social unsettlement 
provided by Lizardo and Strand (2010), parallels begin to emerge. Remember that they 
direct that social unsettlement—and its effects on ideological and behavioral change—
can exist on a continuum that is derived from, first, whether explicit institutional 
prescription exists to address a change in circumstances and, second, where such 
prescription does not exist, whether the unsettling circumstance is recognized. Strong 
institutional prescription leads to an adherence to tradition and a common-sense view of 
the world, while relatively weaker prescription featuring gaps or cracks develops into 
social action first through regulated improvisation, before additional recognition of the 
unsettling circumstances trigger greater and more cognitively costly ideological shifts 
(Lizardo & Strand, 2010).  
There is a critical distinction here between older conceptions of toolkit theory that 
strikes to the heart of the concept of unsettlement. There is no requirement, per Lizardo 
and Strand (2010), that unsettlement be based in actual recognition of the breakdown of 
cultural scaffolding.  Instead, there may be a period prior to recognition of this 
breakdown in which cognitive effects may be observed, but before the commencement of 
the hard work of ideological shift. They analogize the period that “predate[s] periods of 
reflexive recognition of unsettledness” to the “situation in…cartoons in which the animal 
walks off the cliff but keeps ‘hanging in the air’ and does not start to fall until it looks 
down” (Lizardo & Strand, 2010, p. 220).   
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c. Correspondence Between Observed Narratives and Stages of Unsettlement.  
Within its division between instances in which institutional prescription exists, 
and its division between recognition and non-recognition of the breakdown of cultural 
scaffolding, is a system that bears marked similarities to the four ways of thinking about 
future environmental change that were observed and their interaction with the 
maintenance of ontological security. Although these similarities are imperfect because 
the use of a continuum tends to presume a categorical separation between each narrative, 
which was not observed, the use of Lizardo & Strand’s (2010) continuum proves to be 
analytically useful because the use of an analogy to their theoretical approach weds 
developments in cultural and cognitive sociology with inquiries into environmental 
change.  
Nor does variation within perspectives in this community or overlap between the 
themes were each observed prove to be fatal to the utility of this continuum as analytical 
tool. Lizardo and Strand (2010, p. 223) observe that “not all actors will be equally able to 
adapt to newer externalized cultural scaffoldings to the same degree” because “all periods 
of dissolution of external support for action and the reconstitution of new ones separates 
actors into institutional generations” in at least the context of practical (i.e. automatic) 
consciousness, due to different levels of habituation to the preceding form. In the case of 
place, it seems that the distinction between the institutionally “old” and the institutionally 
“young” (Lizardo and Strand, 2010, p. 223) implicates not only age, but perhaps also 
length of time in residence in a place as well as qualitative aspects of residence, 
perspectives on local history, and interaction with the environment. Their use of a 
continuum, therefore, may illustrate categorical differences but should not reify the same 
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by implying that each is wholly distinct from the others. People are complex and their 
reactions to environmental change proved to be similarly complex.  
Here, a final word of caution about the use of the continuum is appropriate. It may 
be more useful to envision their continuum not as a line but as a circle with each of the 
four discursive camps on a separate pole. Starting with this representation, when 
emphasis is placed one pole it will deform the circle by creating a bulge. Similarly, when 
a pole is de-emphasized or ignored it may be represented by a depression. The bulge or 
depression would tend to stretch the circle away from the other poles, but usually 
incompletely. Envisioning these relationships in this way would emphasize that these 
categories can co-exist and that their influence is relative not absolute. In this way it is 
possible to graphically represent the relationships between narratives absent the 
implication that one destroys the others, and preserving the ability to add additional 
narratives to the circle.  
Beginning with periods of grossest unsettlement, Lizardo and Strand (2010) 
describe a two-phase period after which existing cultural scaffolding has broken down. 
The early phase precedes reflexive recognition of this breakdown while the late phase 
incorporates such reflexive recognition, leading to the conclusion that existing 
approaches may no longer be appropriate or sufficient. They equate this later period to 
the “high ideology” periods described by Swidler (1986), which “seemingly 
‘meaningless’ patterns (in contexts featuring stable scaffolding) of belief and practice 
come to be charged with crucial meaning resulting in group polarization and bouts of 
ideological organization at the ‘cultural system level’ keyed around a predictively small 
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(e.g. cognitively manageable) set of ‘take off’ issues or cultural practices” (Lizardo & 
Strand, 2010, p. 222).   
These “late periods” after “reflexive recognition that [externalized cultural] 
scaffolding have…broken down…[may] set off the conscious search for new models”  
(Lizardo & Strand 2010, p. 220). Within toolkit theory, this is the stage around which 
reorganized strategies of action are formed, but these are “cognitively costly…[meaning] 
that the development of new ideological systems are expected to require specially 
demanding representational and mnemonic resources beyond those usually considered” 
(Lizardo & Strand 2010, p. 222, emphasis added).   
For Bob, the only member of the sample who had resolved to move away due to 
environmental risk, the description of the cognitive cost to he and his wife is relatively 
clear. Perhaps because he is so well informed—remember that he is a retired geophysical 
scientist who takes pride in his ability to remain abreast of new developments in his 
field—they found themselves at the highly unsettled end of the spectrum and decided to 
revise their strategy of action for life. Yet most people do not subscribe to this strategy, 
and this also makes sense. Cognitive cost also applies to those who recognize the danger 
presented yet for whatever reason plan on staying. Lizardo and Strand (2010, p. 222) 
posit that “the motivation to develop, search for, or adopt new explicit ideologies to 
organize action can only come after a period in which old, practical strategies of action 
are applied in the context of dissolving objectified support for them and the person 
records a series of violations of expectations for the future.” This expectation is 
complicated in the context of the CSZ earthquake and tsunami because there is no direct 
local precedent within the social memory of this participant cohort. While some 
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participants related that the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004 and the 
Fukushima earthquake and tsunami in 2011 focused their attention on the local 
possibilities, these analogous events remained distant. 
i. Environmental Determinism and Chronic Unsettlement. 
Notwithstanding the absence of this local precedent, based on the memory of the 
expected future and constant reminders of this future that challenge practical expectations 
(be they in the form of tsunami warning signs, discourse, or personal experience) some 
people will not yet be motivated to adopt new strategies of action but will be “subject to a 
chronic state of ‘unsettledness’ [and] will evince a demand for explicit cultural 
systems…to guide their action” (Lizardo & Strand 2010, p. 222). This chronic state of 
unsettledness absent revised strategies of action reflects a stage on the continuum in 
which, overall, people are unsettled yet perhaps they have not become sufficiently so, or 
at the present time experienced sufficiently contradictory circumstances, to precipitate the 
change to strategies of action notwithstanding palpable anxiety that in some cases 
resembles despair or resignation.  
This is typified by Melinda, whose anxiety manifested in the proclamation that 
“we’re all dead” based on her observations of the altitude that was affected by past 
tsunamis, yet who also seemed resigned to living with the risk. She and others who 
similarly visualize the future cannot be compartmentalized into a unitary manifestation of 
“unsettled” that automatically drives action. There is no flip of a switch and declaration 
of unsettlement, but fluid boundaries between the discursive categories as they map the 
process by which settlement becomes unsettlement. Thus environmental determinism 
exists in different forms that may be reflective of placement on the continuum within the 
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post-recognition category. Some participants also made statements that suggested that 
this last phase of unsettlement might be subject to emotional mediation in a manner 
similar to what was observed by Norgaard (2011) in the climate change context. The 
multiplicity of causes would also serve to explain some of the internal diversity of 
thought in this group. 
ii. Isolation, Self-Reliance, Recognition, and Socio-Historical Identity. 
While environmental determinism represents the apex of unsettlement, albeit one 
represented by both an active and more passive type of response, isolation and self-
reliance represent a symbolic blurring of the determinist vision of the future, replacing a 
portion of the material reality of the geophysical world with a vision of identity-based 
human action. How this operates in practice seems analogous to what Lizardo and 
Strand’s (2010, p. 220) period of “early unsettlement,” before the reflexive recognition of 
the breakdown of applicable cultural scaffoldings: these are “periods in which actors still 
attempt to implement old, habitual strategies of action in objective contexts that no longer 
facilitate them.” Local tradition and identity formed the basis for much of the discourse 
that surrounded isolation and self-reliance, with isolation encompassing both visions of 
the distant past, more recent feelings of physical and social isolation, the exigencies of 
geography, and self-reliance emerging from narratives of common social history.  
Isolation as a concept joins with viscerally felt associations with community such 
as a small town character and the natural endowments that provided the primary 
motivation for many to live in the area; that it was so prevalent in future visions of 
disaster follows the logic of early stage unsettlement. As stated by Lizardo and Strand 
(2010, p. 220, emphasis added), within this pre-reflexive recognition world:  
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[A]t the level of discursive consciousness persons are expected to mobilize 
a seemingly endless labile armamentarium of justifications and framing 
strategies that serve to manage their perceptions and ultimately delay 
recognition that a particular taken for granted external structure for 
organizing action can no longer be relied on. 
 
Since recognition is the factor that drives cognitive movement from relative 
settlement to unsettlement, the cultural and social symbols that are employed in this 
context may therefore influence whether and to what extent unsettlement is felt in light of 
changing circumstances. In this way, the multiplicity of relationships between future 
environmental change and social motivation begin to come into sharper relief. It became 
apparent within the interview process that the relationship between environmental 
determinism and isolation and self-reliance exists less as discrete point on a continuum 
and more as a complex. While each conceptually elaborates on unsettlement, there was 
no observed one-to-one relationship between a particular viewpoint and unsettlement. 
The representational and mnemonic forms provided by deep cultural associations did 
seem to acquire additional meaning within the context of greater unsettlement: instead of 
isolation being conceived as a function of ease of shopping or attraction of tourists (as 
sometimes came up early in interviews before environmental change was broached), it 
becomes a frame for geophysical and social fractures within the community, as well as 
fractures between the community and outside based in trust and safety.  
Within the practical consciousness, this period is marked by “hysteresis” or a 
“false anticipation of the future” (Lizardo & Strand, 2010, p. 221). While within an 
interview process it is difficult to trace the operations of the practical consciousness 
because the process itself is founded in discourse, Lizardo and Strand’s (2010) “key 
theoretical implication” arising from the operations of the practical consciousness in the 
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early reflexive period is critical. It suggests that “repeated experience with external 
cultural scaffoldings for creating and managing lines of action…‘train’ practical 
consciousness to expect them to be consistently available, even when they are no longer 
around to support action” (Lizardo and Strand 2010, p. 221).  
Accordingly, rather than merely influencing the way that people think about 
future environmental change, discursive memories of the future might tend, through the 
use of inference and assumptions regarding possibilities, to direct choices regarding 
response. Observing the internal structure of this complex of discursive factors that 
influence unsettlement, it is intriguing to consider that symbolic isolation lies on or close 
to the border of the late stage of reflexive recognition that is linked to the greatest level of 
unsettlement, while symbolic self-reliance tends to locate the discourse more fully into 
the early stage marked by false anticipation of the future and a tendency to develop 
internal risk probabilities based on past experience (per Lizardo & Strand, 2010, p. 221). 
Therefore the way that future risk is not only thought about, but felt, may be influenced 
by these factors.  
 iii. Symbolic Preparedness: Fractured Institutional Prescription.  
Symbolic preparedness appears to represent a phase that lies closer towards 
settlement on the spectrum suggested by Lizardo and Strand (2010). Preceding the full 
breakdown of cultural scaffolding—perhaps in the context of perception of a future event 
this is better described as preceding explicit breakdown of a sense of stability and 
meaning based on expectation—that has been analogized in this paper to environmental 
determinism and symbolic isolation and self-reliance there is a period in which people 
begin to perceive gaps at the intersection of institutional domains. Within these contexts, 
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which exist “between the crevices” of direction provided by institutional domains, 
cultural elaboration operates in an inverse relation to the levels in which institutions 
“constrict discretion” (Lizardo & Strand, 2010, p. 218).  
Therefore this form of unsettlement exists as a balance between institutional 
direction and a feeling that people have been “left to their own devices” (Lizardo & 
Strand, 2010, p. 218).  In the context of the expected CSZ event, the clearest institutional 
direction exists in the form of entreaties to be prepared and aids to preparedness. This is 
embodied on the landscape and within the relations of the community on an interpersonal 
and official level. There may be insufficient cultural scaffolding to fully address 
knowledge of future prediction and there is a palpable sense that in some ways 
preparation is personal and each individual is left to his or her own devices. On the other 
hand there is significant institutional direction in favor of preparedness as a concept and 
in favor of particular modes of preparation, as well as communication of these modes.  
At this stage, at the level of practical consciousness “regulated improvisation” 
takes the fore; this is an expression of “‘deep’ embodied dispositions, produced through 
consistent, protracted experiences in externally structured environments” that is neither 
fully improvised nor fully regulated (Lizardo & Strand 2010, p. 218). Preparation 
appeared to be individualized and involved a great deal of personal choice, 
notwithstanding the countervailing penumbra of institutional prescription. In these 
“institutionally ill-defined crevices…embodied dispositions…will be most prevalent and 
the implicit culture stored as embodied dispositions will be most likely to shape choices” 
(Lizardo & Strand 2010, p. 218).  
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“In the absence of external cultural scaffolding [within these crevices] agents will 
rely on the coherence and ‘regulated improvisation’ made possible by their practical 
internal dispositions, especially those that produce fast…cognitive emotive judgments of 
“right/wrong [and] like/dislike….” People will begin to create myths based on “bits and 
pieces of the external cultural environment” (Lizardo & Strand 2010, p. 218) that operate 
to justify particular courses of action. Preparation as a practice also seems to have been 
dependent on regulated improvisation with respect to its particular form and degree 
(including whether it was had developed from idea to practice in the first place). 
In a sense preparedness in this context is best understood as bearing a recursive 
relationship with unsettlement. First, like but to a greater extent than symbolic isolation 
and self-reliance, the process of discursively creating future memory appears to reduce 
unsettlement by shifting the focus away from environmental determinism and towards 
individualized or community action. In this way it operates as the myth that justifies a 
particular course of action. It also, however, seems to map the expected result of the 
operation of the practical consciousness in this context: an improvisational scheme in 
which people improvise but they do not create modes of improvisation “out of thin air.” 
Rather, institutional direction matters.  
Therefore, the regulated improvisation of preparedness operates both as the 
motivational and justificatory myth and as the practical consequence of that myth. The 
act of being prepared, or at least thinking of being prepared, takes the place of the more 
unsettling discourses of environmentally deterministic visions. It also appears likely that 
these narratives forestall the point not only of unsettlement but also of recognition of the 
 103 
unsettlement in the first place. Yet as might be expected the cultural and institutional 
symbols and tools seemed to be imbued with shallower cultural associations.  
Institutional direction and recent experience seem to take the fore here, absent the 
depth of collective meaning and identity normally associated with narratives of isolation 
and self-reliance. With greater institutional direction, then, there is less need for the 
creative deployment of the deep cultural repertoire. This is why self-reliance and 
preparedness seemed analytically distinct: while an argument could clearly be made that 
they are related and in practice there was overlap between the groups (for example, the 
description of a home garden as a potential food source), preparedness evidenced a 
shallower and more immediate wellspring of the applicable social repertoire of tools 
whereas the repertoire for self-reliance was deeper and more historically grounded.  
iv. Analogy to the Familiar: Strong Institutional Prescription. 
In relation to these aspects of environmental change, climate change related 
flooding has a far closer analog in regular winter flooding, and thus institutional—and 
more importantly personal—prescription exists through example. The future memory of 
these events has in most cases a relatively recent mnemonic precedent that obviates the 
need for creativity. It stands to reason, then, that people tend to remain with traditional 
way of addressing these issues and there is little, if any, push for responsive cultural 
retooling. People are settled.  
Furthermore, the sense of optimism that was related by survey participants seems 
to mirror a standard mode of discourse in the community that seeks to identify options to 
overcome long-standing economic doldrums through the area’s natural endowments. In 
this sense, the default to traditional and commonsensical views of the world maps what 
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theorists predict in a state of relative settlement. Whether these views tend to differ from 
those on the CSZ earthquake and tsunami due to differences in the profile of temporal 
uncertainty, the relatively more politicized nature of climate change compared to other 
hazards, the unique attributes of this stretch of coastline, or some other factor was not 
evident. Reduced to it simplest essence analogy to the familiar encourages a thought 
process of “we have this under control already,” the symbols of preparedness encourage 
and reflect a thought process of “we know what to do and are doing it,” and the symbols 
of isolation and self-reliance encourage a thought process of “we are the kind of people 
who will figure this out and survive.” 
It is also interesting to consider that these may represent identity-based methods 
of emotional protection that bear a strong similarity to the strategies described by 
Norgaard (2011, 2009). In line with her work, it also emphasizes that the cultural and 
social tools that are available to communities and individuals in response to unsettling 
realities may also be generative or destructive of predicate unsettlement. Redefining 
cultural endowments as susceptible to deployment in response to unsettlement, and also 
formative of unsettlement, allows these related but distinct ideas to be viewed as part of a 
greater interactive complex of identity, perception, knowledge, and future memory that 
influence the ability and willingness of communities to embrace certain plans of 
responsive action.  As with preparedness, these factors may work in a recursive fashion, 
influencing their subject identities through thought and action, which in turn influences 




d. Summary.  
Table 2 summarizes the linkages between the theoretical expectations of Lizardo 
and Strand (2010) and their putative analogs in the field of environmental change, as 
have been described in this study. At risk of overemphasizing the categorical differences 
between the four described discursive categories, it draws together the four observed 
categories with their closest analog found in this literature. Moving from a state of 
settlement to unsettlement first begins with a distinction between approaches to climate 
change related risk and risk arising from earthquake and tsunami.  
Analogy to the familiar allows for recent experience and tradition expressed as 
common sense to predominate, effectively disarming potential unsettlement. Where 
institutional prescription in the form of preparedness efforts discursively predominate, 
discourses focused on preparedness acts in a cyclical fashion both as a cause of regulated 
improvisation and its outcome. Where the narratives told by people essentially denied 
any sort of institutional precedent or direction for their vision of the future, discourses 
shifted to symbolic isolation and self-reliance.  
This appeared to help stave off the later stages of recognition that were necessary 
for a fuller embrace of environmental determinism.  For each applicable thought 
community the chosen discursive frame appears to have influenced, in its own way, 
relative unsettlement. Building off of observed similarities, a framework has thus been 
created that allows for developments in sociological theory to be transposed upon 
discussions of environmental change. Through the use of this method it is possible to 
translate some of the stories that communities tell themselves about future environmental 
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risk into a theoretical framework that was developed for the purpose of describing how 
changes in ideology and action may be formed.  
Table 2. The Stages of the Breakdown of Socio-Cognitive Scaffolding and Analogs within 
Observed Reactions to Environmental Risk. 
 Discursive 
Consciousness 
Level of Prescription 


















Quiescent, reliance on and 
cognitive exploitation of 
objectified institutional 
structures to generate and 




Gaps in the 
institutional order 
Active, “cognitively optimal” 
use of already existing and 
widely shared vocabularies of 
motive, reliance on 
“institutional myths” to 
explain action; loose coupling 
or “dissociation” between 
justifications for action and 




between embodied habits 






Gaps in the 
institutional 
order 
Production of globally 




situations; criteria of 
judgment refractory to 
discursive consciousness 
and hard to verbalize and 
“redescribe” into public 
language. 
Analogy to the Familiar. 
Narratives that describe 
and conceptualize the 
world by reference to 
known or sincerely 
expected material reality. 
Perhaps linked to the use 
of identity and experience 
in emotional mediation.  
 
Symbolic Preparedness.  
Symbols of preparedness 
and human action takes the 
fore in the way people 
visualize the future. In 
some cases the narrative 
belies the scope of 








Early (before reflexive 
recognition) 
Continued reliance on existing 
vocabularies of motive, 
cognitively optimal attempts 
to explain away anomalies. 
 
 
Late (after reflexive 
recognition) 
Reflexive, “cognitively costly” 
search for and possible 




schematic transfer across 
institutional domains. 









Late (after reflexive 
recognition) 
Retooling/retraining/acq
uisition of new habits 
and skills/readjustment 
of future expectations. 
 
Symbolic Isolation and 
Self-Reliance.  
Tradition and identity 
begin to occupy a more 
central place in narratives 
of environmental change, 
and are more charged 




Narratives begin to focus 
more on the material 
reality. Potential for 
update.  
The three leftmost columns have been imported from Lizardo and Strand (2010, p. 216). The rightmost 





Tierney (2007, 1999) hoped that the sociology of natural hazards would embrace 
interdisciplinary efforts to understand the social construction of risk in these settings. 
Moreover, she asked that natural hazards theory not only serve as a passive recipient of 
advances made in other fields of theory, but be generative of new social approaches to 
risk and uncertainty. In this paper, an attempt has been made to use disparate fields to 
theorize a new approach to understanding future catastrophic environmental risk. Moving 
beyond risk “realism” and categorical approaches to risk, the method presented employs 
a bottom-up approach to understand how localized thought communities remember an 
uncertain future: how they visualize potentially horrific events. It was discovered that 
these understandings are not created out of thin air but rather employ local place histories 
and identities; the meanings and associations developed between communities and place 
over time are projected into the way people anticipate the future.  
Using recent theory that was primarily focused on harmonizing the cultural toolkit 
theory originally described by Ann Swidler and strong practice theory developed by 
Pierre Bourdieu, an analogy to the way that people interact with the risk of future 
environmental change was developed. Rather than a holistic demonstration of every 
perspective on environmental change locally, much less on a broader scope, four distinct 
narratives of future memory emerged. While defying the sort of categorical distinctions 
that tends to facilitate easy analysis, they corresponded neatly with categories that have 
been used to explain the development and effects of social unsettlement. By extension 
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they link to theory about the operation of ideological and behavioral update in response to 
changing circumstances. 
A secondary benefit of this method is the useful merger of historical periods, 
beginning with products of the settlement of the area by people of Euro-American 
descent, moving forward in time through successive periods of resource extraction and 
economic flux, and continuing into the present day. Socially constructed narratives of 
environmental change in this community, and likely many others, are best viewed along a 
temporal continuum beginning in the distant past, incorporating the stories of history and 
the present, and continuing into the future. Efforts to plan and prepare for these changes 
on a local level should recognize that the way people understand environmental change is 
often not grounded in the material reality of the present or the future, but is an amalgam 
of material and social realities, past, present, and future.  
Going forward this method presents a basis to extend analysis of social 
vulnerability and natural hazards planning beyond the mere use of broadly defined social 
and demographic categories as proxies for risk. An approach that takes into account 
localized understandings of the meaning of place and community and how each 
influences the way that the future is remembered provides an opportunity to better 
understand our interactions with environmental change, especially when the scope and 
form of that change remains uncertain. Of course, even in a local context the patterns of 
community and place identities that influence our interactions with catastrophic risk are 
by no means reducible to four analytical categories. In the future these explorations 
should be applied to understand how environmental thought communities are formed and 
the factors influencing the bases of those communities and bases of the thought processes 
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that bind them together. Furthermore additional areas of variability—including the 
factors that draw people to place, their incentives to stay there, their rationale for either 
optimism or pessimism, and the salience of various factors that affect their community—
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